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NEPA AT THE LIMITS OF RISK ASSESSMENT:
WHETHER TO DISCUSS A POTENTIAL
TERRORIST ATTACK ON A NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
Michael Hill*
This Note explores the question of whether to address the environmental
impacts of a potential terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
assert that the risk of terrorism is unquantifiable and too remote to warrant
consideration under NEPA. In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit concludes that the risk is foreseeable enough that it cannot be
disregarded as a matter of law and that a qualitative discussion of a range
of potential impacts is possible. This Note argues that discussion of this
risk under NEPA is consistent with the statute, which calls for discussion of
both indirect impacts and potentially catastrophic impacts even if they are
low probability or uncertain. This Note also argues that some scholarship
on risk assessment and risk management, particularly one recent theory of
catastrophic risk management, supports regulation of highly uncertain,
potentially catastrophic risks, such as terrorism, and discussion of this risk
under NEPA is an important step toward ensuring the public that the NRC
is seriously addressing it.
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INTRODUCTION
If there ever were a time that seemed ripe for nuclear energy, it's now.
While the nuclear power industry has been criticized for decades over
issues such as cost, safety, nuclear waste, and high-profile accidents such as
Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, more environmentalists, and Americans
in general, have recently gravitated toward the industry's side.2 Concerns
over climate change have fueled much of this change of heart: while
traditional coal-based power plants emit large amounts of carbon dioxide,
nuclear plants emit virtually none.3 The nuclear industry has responded to
this opportunity by emphasizing ongoing improvements of existing plants,
as well as vastly improved designs for new plants.4 Nuclear energy has also
become an important bargaining chip in the debate over climate legislation,
as congressional advocates seek to obtain supporters by emphasizing
nuclear power as a green, efficient substitute for carbon dioxide producing
coal plants.5
Despite this optimism, there has also been an ongoing parallel debate.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, critics contended that
nuclear plants were insufficiently prepared for a potential attack. 6
Significantly, the government's 9/11 Commission Report suggests that al-
Qaeda terrorists contemplated attacking a nuclear power plant on
September 11.7 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), on the other
hand, emphasizes that it has undertaken intensive security measures to
guard against an attack and that, in any case, the probability of a successful
attack is low. 8 The NRC cites several reasons for this conclusion, including
higher security, military readiness, protective barriers, and the fact that a
plant is a difficult target to hit from the air.9 However, critics contend that
the government is "overly optimistic."' 1  Critics also emphasize the
1. Rebecca Smith, The New Nukes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2009, at RI.
2. See id. See generally Roland M. Frye, Jr., The Current "Nuclear Renaissance" in
the United States, Its Underlying Reasons, and Its Potential Pitfalls, 29 ENERGY L.J. 279
(2008) (discussing a number of reasons for the growing support for nuclear plants in the
United States).
3. Smith, supra note 1.
4. See id. (noting that the industry plans to enhance safety by using automated safety
features, minimizing the amount of hardware needed to shut down the reactor in an
emergency, cutting costs (by "squeez[ing] more power out of uranium," for example), and
finding ways to minimize waste).
5. See H. Josef Hebert, Nuclear Energy Becomes Pivotal in Climate Debate, ABC
NEWS, Oct. 25, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=8910072.
6. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Officials Fear Reactors Are Vulnerable to Attacks by
Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at B8; Steve Hargreaves, The Threat of Nuclear
Meltdown, CNNMONEY.COM, Nov. 12, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/l1/12/news/
economy/nuclear-security/index.htm.
7. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 245 (2004).
8. See Hargreaves, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see also Posting of Joe Romm to Climate Progress, http://climateprogress.org/
2009/03/27/three-mile-island-anniversary-meltdown-nuclear-power-problems/ (Mar. 27,
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problem of spent fuel pools, on-site pools of unusable but extremely
hazardous nuclear waste, which are generally much more vulnerable and
less protected than the reactor core.11 They argue that in light of the
significant populations surrounding many nuclear plants, the NRC should
do everything in its power to guard against an attack. 12
In light of this controversy, citizen groups and states have challenged the
NRC's refusal to consider the risk of a terrorist attack under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 13 Under NEPA, a federal
agency completing a major federal action must complete a detailed
statement considering the potential environmental impacts of its action,
including a discussion of alternatives to the action that might mitigate these
impacts. 14 NRC actions such as relicensing or adding a storage facility to a
plant, which were at issue in the cases discussed in this Note, undoubtedly
require an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), the most detailed review
required under NEPA. 15
However, it is often unclear when environmental impacts are significant
enough to warrant discussion. 16 For instance, it is unclear how agencies
and courts should weigh both the probability of a particular impact
occurring and the severity of the consequences if it were to occur in
deciding whether it must be considered under NEPA.17 In San Luis Obispo
Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission18 and New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,19 two U.S. circuit courts addressed this issue in the context of
potential terrorist attacks on a nuclear facility, yet they came to very
different conclusions. 20 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the risk of a terrorist attack was reasonably foreseeable and
2009, 14:46 EST) (noting the opinion of Ed Lyman, senior staff scientist at the Union of
Concerned Scientists, that "there is overconfidence on the part of the industry and NRC that
has led to complacency"); Cindy Skrzycki, Terror-Plane Risk Jars Faith in Nuclear Safety,
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&refer=
columnist-skrzycki&sid=aPC14tlGDl_c (describing the NRC's proposal to assess only
some new plant designs for risk of an air attack and critics' contention that all current
nuclear power plants should have to undergo this assessment).
11. At many plants, spent fuel pools are located several stories above ground,
intensifying the concern that a terrorist might have access to them. See Hargreaves, supra
note 6; see also Wald, supra note 6 (noting that the security of spent fuel casks "against
attack with an antitank weapon or other armament is less certain").
12. See Hargreaves, supra note 6 (citing opinion of a former security expert at the
Department of Energy, who noted that "' [i]f you get a fire at Indian Point [Energy Center in
Buchanan, New York] in the spent fuel pool, it's going to take out New York City').
13. See, e.g., infra Parts I.B.3, II.
14. See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part I.C (discussing different methodologies to examine and assess
environmental risks).
18. 449 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006).
19. 561 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009).
20. See infra Part II.
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not "'remote and highly speculative,"' 21 and thus the environmental effects
of an attack warranted discussion under NEPA. 22 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, on the other hand, concluded there was not a
sufficient "'reasonably close causal relationship' between the agency
action of relicensing a nuclear plant and the effects of a terrorist attack, and
thus an analysis of these effects in the NEPA context was outside the "rule
of reason." 23
This Note argues that the language of NEPA and its corresponding
regulations anticipate discussion of the environmental impacts associated
with terrorist attacks. NEPA mandates discussion of a range of
environmental impacts, including indirect impacts; 24 does not require
quantification; 25 and calls for discussion of catastrophic impacts, even if
they are of low probability, as long as they are foreseeable and within a rule
of reason. 26 Courts have largely abandoned these requirements. Lacking a
clear framework for analyzing highly uncertain "new" risks such as
terrorism, 27 courts have instead reached for bits and pieces of methods and
principles used by agencies to assess risk,28 each of which comes with its
own assumptions and limitations. 29 This Note argues that courts that abide
by the relatively broad language of NEPA should mandate that agencies
qualitatively consider a range of environmental impacts resulting from a
potential terrorist attack.30 This Note also argues that one framework, the
Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle-which calls for a presumption
in favor of regulating plausible yet uncertain risks with the potential for
catastrophic harm--can help courts make sense of NEPA's requirements in
the context of terrorism. 31
Part I of this Note discusses NEPA generally, including relevant
legislative background, the language of the statute and regulations
themselves, the policies underlying the statute, and jurisprudential
interpretation. Part I then discusses courts' and the NRC's traditional
treatment of remote risks and impacts under NEPA, including the risk of
terrorist attacks. Finally, Part I surveys the literature on risk assessment and
risk management in the federal government, including traditional
approaches, newer theoretical approaches such as the Precautionary
21. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Warm Springs Dam Task Force v.
Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 1980)).
22. See infra notes 240-57 and accompanying text.
23. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139-40; see infra notes 280-93 and
accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 53, 141-42 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., infra notes 145, 175, 248, 250 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the distinction between "historical" and "new" risks, see infra
notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part I.C (discussing a few different methods used to analyze risk).
29. See infra notes 338-41 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 227, 249, 253, 314 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Parts I.C.3, III.B.2.
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Principle, and an approach specifically addressing potentially catastrophic
risks such as terrorism.
Part 1I analyzes the circuit split and addresses arguments for and against
mandating that the NRC analyze the risk of a terrorist attack under NEPA.
Finally, Part III argues that the NRC should analyze the risk of a terrorist
attack on a nuclear facility under NEPA. Part III first argues that analysis
of the environmental effects of a terrorist attack is consistent with NEPA's
statutory and regulatory language, the jurisprudence interpreting the statute,
and the underlying policies envisioned by the NEPA framers. It also
contends that, as a normative matter, contemporary scholarship on
catastrophic risk management provides a strong methodological basis for
analyzing these risks in substantive detail in an EIS.32
I. NEPA, ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS, TERRORISM, AND METHODOLOGIES
AVAILABLE TO FEDERAL AGENCIES AND COURTS
Part I introduces NEPA, agency and judicial approaches toward assessing
environmental risks, including remote risks in the NEPA context, and the
literature on risk assessment in general. Part L.A looks at the statutory and
regulatory text of NEPA, as well as the ways in which courts have
implemented the statute's requirements. Part I.B discusses the U.S.
Supreme Court's treatment of remote risks under NEPA. It then discusses
how some courts and, most importantly, the NRC have treated the risk of
terrorist attacks or sabotage on nuclear facilities under NEPA. Part .C
surveys the risk assessment literature. It first looks at traditional notions of
probabilistic risk assessment and risk management in the federal
government, as well as common criticism of these notions. It then
discusses a common approach that rebuts many of the tenets of traditional
risk assessment and risk management, the Precautionary Principle. Finally,
it looks at recent literature on assessing and regulating catastrophic risks.
A. The National Environmental Policy Act: A General History
1. Background and Purposes
NEPA 33 is a foundational statute that established a national policy to
promote and protect the environment. 34 NEPA stems from the polity's
32. One student commentator has addressed this issue in the past. See Amanda Mott,
Comment, Should the Threat of a Terrorist Attack on a Nuclear Power Plant Be Considered
Under NEPA Review?, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 333 (2007). However, that
comment was published before the Third Circuit issued its decision in New Jersey
Department of Environmental Conservation v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 561
F.3d 132 (2009). In addition, the comment focuses more heavily on the specific factual
vulnerabilities of various nuclear plants in its argument that the risk of a terrorist attack
should be considered under NEPA. In contrast, this Note takes a more theoretical approach,
discussing various methods for assessing and managing risk and applying these concepts to
both NEPA and terrorism. Moreover, this Note explicitly analyzes the implicit
methodologies and assumptions underlying both circuit courts' approaches.
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2006).
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growing awareness of the country's unchecked impact on the
environment, 35 including the risks associated with increasing air and water
pollution, nuclear power plants, and toxic waste. Senator Henry Jackson,
the chairman of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee-who
introduced the original bill to Congress on February 18, 1969 36-wanted to
control federal mission agencies, which at that time pursued their particular
mandates with little ability to take environmental factors into account.37
When agency actions were challenged, the agencies either replied that they
had no authority to consider environmental factors or had discretion to
disregard them in favor of developmental, economically advantageous
objectives. 38 While the original bill only included authorization for the
Secretary of the Interior to conduct ecological studies and the creation of a
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), 39 testimony in committee
hearings soon led to the addition of "action-forcing" provisions, which
would require federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of
their actions.40
The final version of NEPA expands upon this by proclaiming that every
agency recommendation and report on proposals for legislation or "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment" should be accompanied by a "detailed statement" addressing
the environmental impact of the proposed action, unavoidable adverse
environmental effects, alternatives to the proposed action, and irreversible
commitments of resources. 41  While the Act declares a national
environmental policy and includes some substantive goals,42 the action-
34. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, The Story of Calvert Cliffs: A Court Construes the
National Environmental Policy Act To Create a Powerful Cause of Action, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 77, 84 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005).
35. See id.
36. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, S. 1075, 91st Cong. (as introduced by
Sen. Jackson, Feb. 18, 1969).
37. See Tarlock, supra note 34, at 85.
38. Id. at 84.
39. S. 1075.
40. See National Environmental Policy: Hearing on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before
the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong. 116 (1969) (statement of Lynton K.
Caldwell, Professor, Indiana University, Bloomington). At this hearing, Professor Lynton
Caldwell, one of the people behind these provisions, stated that "[w]hen we speak of policy
we ought to think of a statement which is ... capable of implementation; that it is not merely
a statement of things hoped for ... but that it is a statement which will compel or reinforce
or assist ... the executive agencies in particular." Id.; see also S. REP. No. 91-296, at 6-7
(1969) (noting that action-forcing provisions were meant to ensure that "all Federal agencies
• . . follow certain procedures and operating principles in carrying out their program
activities").
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
42. See id. § 4331(a) (declaring policy to maintain "conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony"); id. § 4332(b) (listing substantive goals, such as
ensuring all Americans a safe and healthy environment, maintaining the environment for
future generations, and preserving historic and cultural aspects of the environment).
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forcing provision, supervised by the CEQ, 43 lies at the heart of the Act.
Importantly, the proposing agency should request comments from the
public between the draft and final versions of the statement 44 and should
make the final statement available to the public. 45
While CEQ only mandates less detailed documents for some actions,46 an
EIS is required for those proposed actions that are federal, major,47 and
significantly 48 affect the environment. 49 Along with providing a "full and
fair discussion of significant environmental impacts," 50 an EIS should
provide a reasonable set of alternatives which would minimize adverse
environmental impacts;51 thus, an EIS should be used actually to plan the
agency's course of action, rather than merely to disclose information after a
decision has already been made. 52
EISs should also include discussion of both "direct" and "indirect"
effects. 53 While CEQ regulations once mandated discussion of a worst-case
scenario, 54 1986 amendments now only require discussion of "reasonably
foreseeable significant adverse impacts," including impacts on which there
43. See id. §§ 4342-4347 (outlining responsibilities of Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ), such as implementing regulations, reviewing federal programs, and
developing environmental policies).
44. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(4) (2009).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
46. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (discussing when certain actions can be categorically
excluded from NEPA's requirements); id. § 1508.9 (discussing Environmental Assessment,
a briefer document intended to help decide whether or not a more detailed Environmental
Impact Statement is required).
47. The NEPA regulations state that the term "major" "reinforces but does not have a
meaning independent of significantly." See id. § 1508.18. The term "action" is also broadly
construed, encompassing adoption of official policy, rules, regulations, formal plans,
programs, and specific projects by federal agencies. See id.
48. In addressing the significance of a proposed action, the NEPA regulations require
consideration of both (a) context, including whether the effects will be short-term or long-
term and whether they will affect a wide region of interests or a relatively narrow area, and
(b) intensity, including the degree to which proposed actions affect public health and unique
geographic features and the degree to which possible effects are highly uncertain or
controversial. See id. § 1508.27. One court has suggested that the extent to which an action
will cause effects in excess of currently existing uses, as well as the absolute quantitative
effects of an action, including cumulative harm, should be considered in an assessment of the
term "significantly." See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1972).
49. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.3.
50. Id. § 1502.1.
51. Id. § 1502.14 (noting that discussion of alternatives is the "heart" of an EIS).
52. Id. § 1502.1; see also id. § 1502.5 (indicating that agencies should prepare an EIS at
the same time as development of the proposal, so it can "serve practically as an important
contribution to the decision-making process and will not be used to rationalize or justify
decisions already made").
53. Id. § 1508.8. Direct effects include those "caused by the action and occur[ing] at the
same time and place," and indirect effects include those that are "later in time or farther
removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable." Id.
54. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Confronting Uncertainty Under NEPA, ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, July 2009, art. 3, at 21-27, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article= 1111 &context=ils.
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is incomplete or unavailable information. 55  The phrase "reasonably
foreseeable," though, still includes low-probability impacts with
catastrophic consequences, provided the risk of the particular impact is
"supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture,
and is within the rule of reason." 56
2. Implementation Among Courts and Agencies
While NEPA's legislative history and regulations indicate some intent to
foster substantive policy goals, over the years agencies and courts have
essentially fashioned NEPA as a formal, procedural statute. 57 For instance,
the Supreme Court has never overturned an agency's EIS as inadequate. 58
A short discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of NEPA will be
helpful to understand the broad latitude traditionally given to agencies
interpreting the statute.
While the Court has stated that NEPA requires agencies to take a "hard
look" at environmental impacts,59 it has also left the formulation of specific
procedures within the discretion of agencies.60  The Court has cited
administrative efficiency, consistency, and the scientific expertise of
agencies as reasons for this agency deference.61 The Court has also implied
that the substantive policy goals of NEPA have little effect; instead, the
"detailed statement" 62 is the "outward sign" that substantive environmental
values have been taken into consideration.63
55. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(a)-(b).
56. Id. § 1502.22(b)(4). If the means to obtain the information relevant to reasonably
foreseeable significant adverse impacts are not known, the agency shall still include a
summary of existing relevant scientific evidence, a statement of the relevance of the
incomplete information to reasonably foreseeable adverse impacts, and an evaluation of the
"impacts based upon theoretical approaches or research methods generally accepted in the
scientific community." Id. § 1502.22(b).
57. See generally David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some
Possible Explanations for a 12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL. L. 551 (1990) (arguing that the Court's
treatment of NEPA is consistent with ordinary principles of statutory construction); Nicholas
C. Yost, NEPA 's Promise-Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533 (1990) (arguing that the
Court has disregarded the substantive aspects of NEPA).
58. See Shilton, supra note 57, at 551.
59. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (quoting Natural Res. Def.
Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
60. See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S.
519, 524 (1978).
61. See Bait. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 101, 103
(1983). However, while "courts continue to accord significant deference to lead agency
determinations," the standard of high deference employed by the Court in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), does not apply to NEPA.
Wendy B. Davis, The Fox Is Guarding the Henhouse: Enhancing the Role of the EPA in
FONSI Determinations Pursuant to NEPA, 39 AKRON L. REv. 35, 38-39 (2006). While
Chevron purported to give considerable weight to an executive agency's construction of a
statute it was entrusted to administer, no single agency is entrusted to administer NEPA;
thus, agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) do not meet the Chevron
standard. See id. at 39.
62. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)).
63. Id.
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In Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project,64
the Court elucidated the "twin aims" of NEPA: (1) to ensure that an agency
takes environmental considerations into account in its decision making
process and (2) to inform the public that the agency has considered these
environmental factors in its decision. 65 The Court then noted that these two
aims, while compatible in many cases, "are not necessarily coextensive in
every case."'66
In essence, the Court has determined that NEPA is a disclosure
document-as long as foreseeable adverse effects and potential mitigation
measures are identified and evaluated, for example, NEPA does not require
that substantive environmental concerns be given preference or that
mitigation measures are actually adopted.67 Agencies need only follow a
"'rule of reason"' 68 in detailing substantive environmental concerns, and a
"worst case analysis" is clearly not required.69
B. NEPA, Remote Risks, and the Risk of Terrorism
While Part L.A discussed NEPA generally, Part I.B addresses how courts
have decided which effects or impacts are significant enough to warrant
consideration under NEPA. The Supreme Court's "reasonably close causal
relationship" test is a foundational means of addressing these concerns.
This section then discusses the relatively brief references to the risk of
terrorism and sabotage in two NEPA circuit court cases. Finally, this
section discusses an NRC administrative opinion that addresses the risk of
terrorism in detail and has provided the foundation for the NRC's stance on
the issue in subsequent proceedings.
1. The Supreme Court's "Reasonably Close Causal Relationship Test":
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy
Although it did not address terrorism directly, the Supreme Court first
considered remote environmental risks and effects under NEPA in
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy.70 This case
involved the reopening of Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station
after a partial meltdown caused the plant to close temporarily. 71 The Court
determined that the NRC need not consider the potential psychological
64. 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
65. Id. at 143.
66. Id. The Court noted that since NEPA disclosure is subject to the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), an agency may have to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) yet have authority to withhold sensitive national security information from the public
due to the FOIA national security exemption. See id. at 143-45.
67. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-52 (1989).
68. See, e.g., Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 373-74 (1989).
69. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 354.
70. 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
71. Id. at 768-69.
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harm on the community surrounding the plant when completing an EIS in
conjunction with the reopening.72
The Court first noted that NEPA does not require consideration of every
impact or effect of the action, but only the impacts or effects on the physical
environment. 73 The Court further stated that there must be a "reasonably
close causal relationship between a change in the physical environment"
caused by the federal action (here the reopening) "and the effect at issue."'74
Thus, while some potential effects, especially indirect ones such as
psychological stress, can technically be caused by the federal action, they
will nonetheless fall outside the scope of NEPA because "the causal chain
is too attenuated. '75
The element of risk weighed heavily in the Court's decision. The Court
stated that the risk of an accident is not a direct effect on the physical
environment because it is "by definition, unrealized in the physical
world."'76 It also noted that the psychological effects at issue were effects
caused by the mere risk of an accident, rather than the actual concrete
changes in the physical environment. 77 NEPA is generally concerned with
more direct, reasonably foreseeable alterations to the physical
environment, 78 such as "low-level radiation, increased fog . . . and the
release of warm water." 79 The Court thus reasoned that the element of risk
and the perception of risk within the community are "middle links" that
stretch the causal chain beyond the scope of NEPA.80 The Court did not
72. Id. at 768.
73. Id. at 772; see also Robert A. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling in the Twentieth Century:
Technological Risk, Uncertainty and Emotional Distress, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 83, 115 (noting
the Court's conclusion that NEPA is concerned with indirect effects on human health only
insofar as these are ends to be pursued through the means of analyzing direct effects on the
physical environment).
74. Metro. Edison, 460 U.S. at 774.
75. Id. (noting that this limitation on causation is similar to the doctrine of proximate
cause in tort law); see also Bohrer, supra note 73, at 115-16 (describing the Court's
proximate cause analogy as a "rather remarkable turn" in the Court's NEPA reasoning).
76. Metro. Edison, 460 U.S. at 775.
77. See id. at 775 n.9; see also Victor B. Flatt, The Human Environment of the Mind:
Correcting NEPA Implementation by Treating Environmental Philosophy and
Environmental Risk Allocation as Environmental Values Under NEPA, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 85,
92 (1994) (interpreting the Court's opinion to mean that "the impacts of realized risks, which
are physical, are to be considered, but that the impacts of the risks themselves, which are
non-physical, are not"); Mary Elizabeth Nelson, Note, Rejection of Risk under NEPA: Stress
and People Against Nuclear Energy, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 547 (1984) (noting that since
"risk per se was not a cognizable direct effect," the psychological stress resulting from the
perception of that risk was accordingly not cognizable as an "accompanying indirect
effect").
78. See Metro. Edison, 460 U.S. at 776.
79. Id. at 775. The Court also noted that the NRC properly considered the
environmental "effects that will occur if a risk is realized, for example, if an accident
occurs." Id. at 775 n.9.
80. Id. at 775; see also Shilton, supra note 57, at 560 (noting that U.S. Supreme Court
NEPA opinions often express a concern for keeping NEPA duties manageable in light of the
limited resources of federal agencies); Posting of Holly Doremus to Legal Planet: The
Environmental Law and Policy Blog, http:/legalplanet.wordpress.com/2009/04/12/nepa-
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explicitly address whether its holding would change if it were only
considering the environmental effects arising from a nuclear accident, rather
than the psychological effects caused by the mere risk of an attack.
2. Terrorism Addressed: Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and New York v. U.S. Department of
Transportation
A few U.S. courts of appeals have briefly addressed the risk of terrorism
or reactor sabotage under NEPA. In Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,81 a citizen group challenged NRC orders
granting a license to operate a power plant in the Philadelphia area.82 The
NRC refused to consider the risk of sabotage in an EIS because it had
already conducted probabilistic assessments of severe accidents and
concluded that sabotage risks were both sufficiently similar to the risks of
severe accidents and beyond the state of the art of probabilistic risk
assessment. 83 The court deferred to the NRC's contention that it could not
meaningfully address the uncertain risk of sabotage with available risk
assessment techniques 84 and held that the plaintiffs did not advance a
specific method or theory by which the NRC could have meaningfully
addressed the risk of sabotage. 85  The court did note that "the mere
assertion of unquantifiability" does not immunize the NRC from
consideration of the issue under NEPA; nonetheless, unless the plaintiffs
could propose a specific method by which to analyze this risk, the NRC was
entitled to deference. 86
The dissenting opinion disagreed, noting that just because the NRC
deemed the risk of sabotage "unquantifiable" did not mean the NRC could
and-terrorism/ (Apr. 12, 2009) (approving of the Court's opinion since "[c]oncem, although
it may affect one's health if it becomes extreme, is not an environmental effect"). An
alternative way of conceiving this framework is as follows: the original change in the
physical environment is the reopened power plant; the direct environmental effects of the
reopening, such as increased low-level radiation, are clearly cognizable under NEPA;
indirect effects, such as psychological effects, need to be sufficiently causally related to the
direct, environmental effects to be cognizable under NEPA. Since risk alone (or the
perception of risk) is not a direct environmental effect in and of itself, the indirect effect of
psychological stress, caused by the risk itself, is not sufficiently causally related to the actual
direct environmental effects to warrant consideration under NEPA. See Nelson, supra note
77, at 553-55.
81. 869 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1989).
82. Id. at 722-23.
83. See id. at 741-42. The court did, however, note that after the Three Mile Island
accident, it would be "irrational" for the NRC to hold that the risk of a severe accident was
too remote for consideration under NEPA. Id. at 741.
84. See id. at 743.
85. Id. at 743-44.
86. See id. at 744 n.3 1; see also infra Part I.B.3 (describing the NRC's adoption of a
similar conclusion in Private Fuel Storage, L.L.P., 56 N.R.C. 340 (2002), which cited
Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 869 F.2d 719,
throughout the opinion).
3018 [Vol. 78
NEPA AT THE LIMITS OF RISK ASSESSMENT
ignore it.87 It also argued that the NRC had used other methods to analyze
uncertain risks when quantitative, probabilistic risk assessment would be
unhelpful. 88 Thus, since the NRC itself considered sabotage a realistic
possibility 89 and had not illustrated that the risk was "'remote and highly
speculative,"' the risk could not be disregarded under NEPA.90
In New York v. U.S. Department of Transportation,91 the City of New
York challenged a Department of Transportation (DOT) rule allowing
motor vehicles carrying large quantities of radioactive material on routes
near the city, thereby preempting the City's own regulations. 92 The City
challenged the DOT's Environmental Assessment-which conceded that
trucking large quantities of radioactive material through urban centers
creates some potential for serious consequences but ultimately determined
that this possibility did not have a "'significant impact' on the
environment"-and claimed that a more extensive EIS was necessary for
this project. 93 The City argued that the rise of terrorist activities throughout
the world and a government report concluding that "the sabotage of a
shipment of spent fuel is a possibility" mandated a discussion of this risk
under NEPA.94
The court first noted that unlike ordinary NEPA reviews, the "certain
consequences" in this case were not significant; rather, "[i]t is only the risk
of accident that might render the proposed action environmentally
significant. '95 After agreeing that it is the NRC and not the DOT that is
responsible for preventing sabotage and terrorist attacks, the court cited an
NRC report indicating that the human motivations involved in sabotage
cannot be quantified as a probability. 96 In light of the agency's conclusion
that the risks of sabotage "were too far afield" and "added nothing to the
risk of high-consequence accidents," the court deferred to the DOT's
decision not to discuss the matter further in its NEPA review.97
87. Limerick, 869 F.2d at 754-55 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 755.
89. Id. at 757.
90. See id.
91. 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983).
92. See id. at 736-38.
93. Id. at 738-39.
94. Sheila Bond Giglio, Comment, Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Need for
a Flexible Regulatory System, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 51, 59-60 (1985).
95. New York, 715 F.2d at 746; see also Valerie M. Fogleman, Threshold
Determinations Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv.
59, 92-93 (1987) (noting that because the effects of sabotage were scientifically uncertain,
the issue turned upon the Agency's determination of whether the risk was sufficiently
probable).
96. New York, 715 F.2d at 749-50; see also Fogleman, supra note 95, at 93 (concluding
that "[b]ecause the issue involved a threshold decision ... [t]he agency could select its own
methodology for risk assessment as long as it was justified in light of current scientific
opinion").
97. New York, 715 F.2d at 750.
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3. The NRC Weighs In: Private Fuel Storage
Although the aforementioned court decisions show that the NRC did not
believe it had to consider the risk of terrorism in its NEPA reviews, the
NRC explicitly addressed the issue in detail in Private Fuel Storage, L.L. C.
(PFS).98 In this case, Utah asserted that the terrorist attacks of September
11 had "materially changed" the circumstances under which the NRC had
previously rejected analyses of terrorism under NEPA by showing that a
terrorist attack is more likely and more dangerous than previously
thought. 99  The Commission ruled that the risk of terrorism, unlike
foreseeable environmental effects such as changes in local air quality, water
quality, and wildlife (and even rare but fairly predictable events such as
hurricanes and earthquakes), is unquantifiable and thus beyond NEPA
analysis. 100 It listed four primary rationales in support of its ruling. 10 1
The Commission first analyzed NEPA's goals, indicating that NEPA
only requires a discussion of "'reasonably foreseeable"''10 2 impacts, which
courts have interpreted as a "'rule of reason."' 10 3 It then concluded that the
possibility of a terrorist attack is speculative and causally remote from the
expected consequences of agency action. 10 4 It favorably cited Metropolitan
Edison's attenuated causal chain language. 105  The Commission thus
thought it sensible to draw a line in the sand before the risk of a terrorist
attack, limiting NEPA's scope so the process would not become "truly
bottomless." 06
Second, the Commission noted that the events of September 11 have not
changed the fact that the probability of a terrorist attack directed at any
given facility would still be extremely speculative, both quantitatively and
qualitatively. 10 7
98. 56 N.R.C. 340 (2002).
99. Id. at 345; see also Roland M. Frye, Jr., The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Is Not
Required by Statute To Release Terrorism-Related Portions of Environmental Impact
Statements, 55 ADMrN. L. REv. 643, 654-55 (2003) (noting several potential scenarios
advanced by plaintiffs in various NRC proceedings, including air attacks, boat attacks, and
truck bombs on both the reactor and spent fuel storage pools).
100. PFS, 56 N.R.C. at 347 & n.18 (indicating that natural events that are closely related
to the natural environment are reasonably predictable by examining weather patterns and
geological data for the region, while terrorist activity is largely "stochastic" and independent
of the planned facility).
101. See infra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
102. PFS, 56 N.R.C. at 348 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b)).
103. Id. (citing Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2000); San Luis Obispo
Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1300-01 (D.C. Cir. 1984), reh'g granted,
vacated on other grounds, 760 F.2d 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (en banc), affd, 789 F.2d 26
(D.C. Cir. 1986)).
104. Id. at 349.
105. See id. at 349 & n.33.
106. Id. at 350.
107. Id. But see Karl S. Coplan, The Intercivilizational Inequities of Nuclear Power
Weighed Against the Intergenerational Inequities of Carbon Based Energy, 17 FoRDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 227, 245 (2006) (noting that although the risks of terrorism are not easily
quantified, the terrorist attacks of September 11 and a National Research Council report
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Third, the Commission stated that examining the risk of a terrorist attack
would amount to a worst-case analysis, which NEPA does not require.10 8 It
noted that a September 11 -like terrorist scenario merely amounts to a
theoretical possibility and that "[s]ubstituting theoretical possibility for
probability analysis amounts to a worst-case approach."' 0 9 It also rebuffed
Utah's reliance on Sierra Club v. Marsh,110 which held that an EIS should
take into account impacts that are "'sufficiently likely to occur that a person
of ordinary prudence would take [them] into account in reaching a
decision."' I l I The Commission distinguished between the foreseeable
impacts assuming a successful attack and the foreseeable impacts of simply
licensing the facility. 112 In the latter case, a terrorist attack is unlikely to
occur, and thus the environmental effects of this hypothetical attack are
even further along the causal chain and thus outside the scope of NEPA.
113
Finally, the Commission reasoned that analysis of a terrorist attack is a
sensitive national security issue, and thus not compatible with NEPA's
public process. 114 While the NRC already reviews the risk of terrorism to
ensure the safety of nuclear facilities, 115 publicizing information as to
vulnerabilities and security measures at nuclear power plants could
ultimately assist terrorists seeking effective attack methods. 16  The
Commission distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger,
117
concluding that the potential for a similar attack on a nuclear facility exists should lead to the
conclusion that this risk "must be at least as great-or greater-than the risk of accidental
reactor mishap," which the NRC does analyze under NEPA).
108. PFS, 56 N.R.C. at 352 (noting that worst-case analysis distorts and exaggerates the
risks of a terrorist attack and ultimately wastes agency resources); see also Farber, supra
note 54, at 23 (noting that the original NEPA worst-case requirement was replaced because it
"was criticized as being excessively pessimistic and too intrusive on agency discretion").
109. PFS, 56 N.R.C. at 352. But see Farber, supra note 54, at 24 (noting that the amended
regulation still calls for discussion of low-probability catastrophes, and thus it "defines
'worst case' in terms of the rule of reason rather than completely eliminating the worst case
requirement").
110. 976 F.2d 763 (1st Cir. 1992).
111. PFS, 56 N.R.C. at 353 (quoting Marsh, 976 F.2d at 767).
112. Id.
113. See id. at 353-54. But see Farber, supra note 54, at 27 (noting that the current
regulation is still designed to address situations "where a risk is poorly understood but
potentially serious").
114. See PFS, 56 N.R.C. at 354-57.
115. Id. at 343-44 (detailing some of the security and safeguard measures being
examined and improved).
116. See id. at 354-55; see also Frye, supra note 99, at 659 (noting that the apparent
conflict between the protection of sensitive security information under the Atomic Energy
Act (AEA) and the public's right to know under NEPA is illusory because "NEPA's own
language makes clear that an agency's duty to implement NEPA's policies is qualified, not
absolute, and must be trumped where there is an otherwise unavoidable conflict between
NEPA and an agency's authorizing legislation"). Roland M. Frye, Jr., notes that NEPA
should only be implemented "consistent with other essential considerations of national
policy" and is subject to restraints based on "'risk to health and safety, or other undesirable
and unintended consequences,' and thus the AEA's mandate to protect the public health and
safety trumps NEPA. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2000)).
117. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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in which the Court indicated that agencies in certain circumstances can
perform a NEPA review while limiting public disclosure of sensitive
security information,"18 by noting that the NRC was already considering
terrorism outside the NEPA context in this case, and thus the formal NEPA
process would not meaningfully add to its decision-making process. 119
C. Methodologies Available to Federal Agencies and Courts
While the courts mentioned in Part I.B and the NRC have offered varying
rationales for their hesitance to require NEPA review of remote
environmental impacts, including the effects of a terrorist attack, the
theoretical and methodological criteria underlying these rulings often go
unstated. This section discusses risk assessment and risk management,
which have been the prevailing methods available to federal agencies, such
as the NRC, when analyzing environmental risks. 120 This section first
describes a traditional, probabilistic conception of risk assessment in the
federal government, informed mostly by a highly influential 1983 National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, and goes on to examine some of the
criticism of this traditional approach. This section also considers risk
assessment in the context of both NEPA and terrorism. This section then
discusses the Precautionary Principle, a theoretical approach that has gained
some support among the academic community for situations involving
uncertain yet potentially very harmful risks.121 The risk of terrorism, which
is highly uncertain and potentially catastrophic, is a type of risk that the
Precautionary Principle is designed to address. Finally, this section
discusses scholarship addressing risks of catastrophic harm, specifically
focusing on an approach that Professor Cass Sunstein has deemed the
"Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle." 122
118. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143
(1981); see also Frye, supra note 99, at 665-67 (discussing two prominent FOIA
exemptions, an exemption based on a conflicting statute (here the AEA) and a national
defense exemption based on an executive order, which Frye argues permits the exclusion of
terrorism information from public EISs).
119. PFS, 56 N.R.C. at 356-57.
120. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Against "Individual Risk": A Sympathetic Critique of
Risk Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1121, 1133-34 (2005) (discussing how the use of toxic
risk assessment became widespread among federal agencies in the 1980s); Donald T.
Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk
Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 569-70 (1992) (discussing the EPA's embrace of formal
risk analysis as an attempt to "enhance the scientific legitimacy of agency decisions").
121. See generally Stephen M. Gardiner, A Core Precautionary Principle, 14 J. POL.
PHL. 33 (2006) (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of different versions of the
Precautionary Principle).
122. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REv.
841 (2006). For a similar approach to addressing risks of catastrophic harm, see Gardiner,
supra note 121, at 47-49 (formulating the "Core Precautionary Principle").
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1. Risk Assessment
a. The Traditional Account
i. Generally
In 1983, the National Academy of Sciences, in response to a directive
from Congress and a contract with the Food and Drug Administration,
published a foundational text concerning the practice of probabilistic risk
assessment in the federal government.1 23 First, the NAS distinguished
between risk assessment and risk management: risk assessment is the
factual inquiry into "the health effects of exposure of individuals or
populations to hazardous materials and situations," 124  while risk
management involves "weighing policy alternatives and selecting the most
appropriate regulatory action." 125 Thus, while risk assessment is mostly
based upon scientific fact, judgment, and consensus, 126 risk management
necessarily involves "value judgments on such issues as the acceptability of
risk and the reasonableness of the costs of control," 127 which are informed
by political, economic, and social considerations. 128
The NAS divides risk assessment into four steps, 129 but for purposes of
simplicity, this Note will discuss Professor K. S. Shrader-Frechette's three
step formulation: "(1) identification of some public or societal hazard; (2)
estimation of the level and extent of potential harm associated with it; and
(3) evaluation of the acceptability of the danger, relative to other
hazards."' 130 This formula was largely adopted to evaluate the risk of
carcinogens and other hazards already found in the environment, especially
123. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L AcAD. OF Scis., RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS, at ix (1983) [hereinafter NAS, RISK
ASSESSMENT].
124. Id. at3.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 36.
127. Id. at 19.
128. Id. at 18-19.
129. These steps are (1) hazard identification, (2) dose-response assessment, (3) exposure
assessment, and (4) risk characterization. See id. at 19-20.
130. K.S. SHRAVER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND RATIONALITY 5 (1991). in essence, parts (2)
and (3) of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) formulation are condensed into one step
in Professor Shrader-Frechette's formulation. Compare id., with NAS, RISK ASSESSMENT,
supra note 123, at 19-20. NAS step (2), dose-response assessment, refers to the process of
characterizing the change in health effects through different doses of an agent; NAS step (3),
exposure assessment, measures the "intensity, frequency, and duration of human exposures,"
either presently or in hypothetical exposure events; and NAS step (4), risk characterization,
is essentially an accumulation of the data into an overall description of the nature and
magnitude of the risk, informed by steps (2) and (3). See NAS, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra
note 123, at 19-20. Professor K.S. Shrader-Frechette's formulation effectively combines
steps (2) and (3) into estimation of the risk, while her third step, evaluation, is largely
analogous to NAS step (4), risk characterization.
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at such contaminated areas as Superfund sites. 131 Professor Richard Wilson
and Dr. Edmund A. C. Crouch label these "historical risks," meaning risks
where adverse events associated with the risk have occurred and are
occurring at a sufficient rate for reasonable data to have accumulated.132
In contrast, some risks, either those associated with an event that has not
occurred sufficiently often to obtain reasonable data or those arising from
events that have not yet occurred, do not fit as well into the standard
framework. 133  Wilson and Crouch label these "new risks," and they
explicitly detail the "risk of death from a U.S. nuclear plant accident" as an
example of this type of risk. 134 New risks are thus inherently more
uncertain; while we can speculate about the worst case, or the "upper limit"
of this type of risk, it is much more difficult to show a lower limit to this
risk or clearly show that the risk is insignificant. 135  However, high
uncertainty does not mean that risk assessment is impossible, for "absence
of certainty is not absence of risk."'136 Indeed, simply because the existence
of a hazard is uncertain or unproven does not make the actual risk of its
occurrence small. 137
In the context of the easier-to-study historical risks that form the
background of traditional risk assessment, however, regulators generally
follow an expected value analysis, in which they multiply the probability of
a particular impact by its consequences, set up a probability distribution,
and "proceed with regulatory decision making as if the harm caused by an
activity were determinate and equal to the expected value."' 138 Thus, in
most risk assessments, the overall estimation of the risk may not reflect an
outcome that is in and of itself probable; instead, this estimate is simply an
average of a variety of potential outcomes, adjusted for their probability.139
ii. The NEPA Context
Risk assessment, expected value analysis, and cost-benefit analysis also
play significant roles in the NEPA context; although the text of NEPA itself
does not explicitly use these terms of art, it is clear that EISs must include a
discussion of the environmental risks, costs, and benefits of a proposed
131. See RICHARD WILSON & EDMUND A.C. CROUCH, RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 13 (2d ed.
2001).
132. Id. at 26.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 58.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 81.
138. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decision Making Under
Uncertainty, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
ISSUES IN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 71, 87 (Timothy Swanson ed., 2002).
139. See WILSON & CROUCH, supra note 131, at 82-83. For example, if there is a ninety-
nine percent chance that zero lives will be lost and a one percent chance that 1000 lives will
be lost, the expected value for loss of life is ten lives, despite the fact that ten lives is not
among the possible outcomes.
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agency action and various alternatives. 140 The NEPA regulations provide
that EISs should "[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all
reasonable alternatives" 141  and discuss both direct and indirect
environmental consequences of the various alternatives. 142  They also
explicitly allow the use of cost-benefit analysis in the decision regarding an
alternative. 143 However, the regulations also make clear that the "weighing
of the merits and drawbacks" in a cost-benefit analysis need not be
monetarily based, especially when there are important nonquantitative or
qualitative considerations. 144 Also important is the provision that any cost-
benefit analysis discussion in an EIS must be made in accordance with
analyses of "unquantified environmental impacts, values, and amenities." 145
EISs often contain elements of traditional risk assessment and cost-benefit
analysis, though no single methodology is required, 146 perhaps due to the
fact that EISs are performed by many federal agencies with different
bureaucratic and methodological frameworks.
b. Criticism
i. Generally
While the above section details the most widespread conception of risk
assessment and risk management in the federal government, it is by no
means the only way for agencies to address risk. Moreover, while agencies
such as the NRC may subscribe to many of the principles underlying this
conception of risk assessment, NEPA itself does not mandate a specific risk
assessment methodology. 147 Thus, it is useful to discuss some criticism of
traditional risk assessment, addressing the potential problems, flaws, and
assumptions of the prevailing methodology.
One potential problem of the NAS's conception of risk assessment is its
treatment of uncertainty. For purposes of this discussion, "risk" refers to
situations where all possible outcomes and their corresponding probabilities
are known, while "uncertainty" refers to situations where potential
outcomes may be known, but the probabilities of various outcomes are
140. See SCHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 130, at 171; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
(2006) (stating that an EIS must include a discussion of environmental impacts of the
proposed action, including adverse impacts that cannot be avoided, alternatives to the
proposed action, and any irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources resulting
from the proposcd action,; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (2009) (noting that alternatives analysis
should include those alternatives that "minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of
the human environment").
141. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
142. Id. § 1502.16.
143. Id. § 1502.23.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see also Farber, supra note 54, at 13 (noting that nothing in NEPA requires
quantification of risks).
146. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24 (stating that an agency must specify what methodology it
uses in conducting an EIS without mandating or recommending a particular methodology).
147. See id.
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partially or wholly unknown. 148 The federal government's reliance on
assessing risks that are readily measurable and of well-defined magnitude,
such as carcinogens in the atmosphere, may serve to neglect those dangers
that hold strong implications for public health, but are much more
uncertain. 149 For these types of uncertain dangers, critics argue that the risk
assessor should attempt to use the best available information and be as
precise as possible, but should also include an estimate of the imprecision
or uncertainty into the assessment.1 50 As Wilson and Crouch note, "[T]he
statement 'we do not know' can be viewed only as procrastination, and not
responsive to the request for a risk estimate." 151
Moreover, even if certain instances of catastrophic harm are deemed to
be low probability rather than merely uncertain, critics still have reason to
question traditional risk assessment. One critic notes that although a high-
probability, low-consequence event and a low-probability, high-
consequence event may have the same expected value under traditional risk
assessment, reasonable people are typically more risk averse to the latter
situation, for reasons of catastrophic potential, unfamiliarity, and the
secondary ripple effects were the catastrophic event to occur.1 52
Accordingly, several critics have "proposed that n lives lost simultaneously
in a catastrophic accident should be assessed as a loss of n2 lives." 153 One
critic has also proposed that risk assessments should employ a weighting
system that gives weight to harder-to-quantify, but nonetheless important,
factors, such as lack of informed consent and catastrophic potential.1 54
However, agencies such as the NRC have consistently accorded more
weight to more easily quantifiable probabilities rather than qualitative
148. See, e.g., Gardiner, supra note 121, at 50; Stewart, supra note 138, at 73-74;
Sunstein, supra note 122, at 876.
149. See WILSON & CROUCH, supra note 131, at 81; see also SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra
note 130, at 102 (noting that "[m]ost technology-related decisionmaking probably takes
place in situations of uncertainty").
150. WILSON & CROUCH, supra note 131, at 84; see also SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note
130, at 95-96 (noting that there is often a great deal of uncertainty in the context of risk
assessment of nuclear power plants, and stating that many of these risks, such as a terrorist
attack on a nuclear facility, "are difficult to handle in probabilistic risk assessment").
151. WILSON & CROUCH, supra note 131, at 84.
152. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 130, at 90; see also id. at 95 (noting, in analogy to
Russian Roulette, that "[e]ven with such a small probability, a person could still be rational
in her refusal to play the game .... Any probability of fatality might be too high if the
benefits deriving from taking the risk were not great enough"); WILSON & CROUCH, supra
note 131, at 41 ("Society legitimately demands that accidents with large consequences be
ruled out, or demonstrated to have a very low probability before the technology is allowed to
proceed."); John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself: The Role of Risk
Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1659 (1995) ("[I]t
is hardly irrational to fear and to protect against catastrophic injury.").
153. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 130, at 94; see also Applegate, supra note 152, at
1656 (noting that the goals of environmental legislation "has at its heart the prevention of
harm before it occurs," which "certainly implies erring on the side of safety when
uncertainty exists").
154. See SHRADER-FRECHETrE, supra note 130, at 183.
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factors and consequences (especially catastrophic consequences) in their
risk assessments. 155
In addition, the NAS-recommended form has been criticized as
inflexible. For example, the sharp distinction between hazard identification
and other steps of risk assessment may cause regulators simply to ignore
risks that have not been identified or measured with a requisite amount of
certainty. 156 One critic thus notes that risk assessment "set[s] the burden of
proof for regulation too high and in the wrong place[s]."'1 57 In addition, the
NAS approach was designed to address very specific risks-chemicals or
carcinogens already present in the environment-and may not apply to
other types of risks, such as industrial or nuclear accidents, which are
inherently more uncertain and less measurable.158
Critics have also claimed that risk assessment proponents incorrectly
assume that analysis of environmental risks is technical, scientific, and
objective, while in reality there are many policy judgments, assumptions,
and significant modeling uncertainties involved. 159  The final step of
Professor Shrader-Frechette's formulation of risk assessment-
evaluation--is particularly open to criticism, for "[t]here are many ways to
answer the question 'How much risk . . . is socially, politically,
economically, and ethically acceptable?""' 160 Since evaluation of the risk
necessarily requires comparing it with other risks, the evaluation can be
affected by what criteria are used in the comparisons. 161 Even the initial
steps of risk assessment, although largely scientific, rely on a large number
of methodological value judgments. 162 Two critics have noted that despite
agencies' arguments that risk assessment "remains primarily a scientific
undertaking," the distinction between risk assessment and risk management
is not so clear cut, and "policy considerations almost invariably underlie,
155. Id. at 94. Professor Shrader-Frechette notes that nuclear risk assessments have often
adopted the "nuisance rule" that emphasizes probabilities when considering risk, "probably
because of society's interest in technological development." Id.
156. WILSON & CROUCH, supra note 131, at 150.
157. Gardiner, supra note 121, at 35.
158. WILSON & CROUCH, supra note 131, at 151; see also SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra
note 130, at 6 (noting that "some hazards, such as carcinogens, were being monitored and
regulated very stringently, whereas others, equally dangerous, were evaluated more
leniently"); id. at 96 (noting that nuclear probabilities are "especially resistant to accurate
estimation").
159. See Gardiner, supra note 121, at 35-36.
160. SIIRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 130, at 7. Professor Shrader-Frechette criticizes
experts' assumptions that quantification alone can evaluate the acceptability of a risk. She
notes that many people's responses to hazards stem from certain aspects, such as a risk being
imposed without consent, the uncertainty surrounding a risk, or potentially catastrophic
consequences, that are either not amenable to quantification or are unrelated to
quantification. See id. at 81-83.
161. Id. at 56 (listing various criteria that regulators can take into account when deciding
the acceptability of a given risk, such as probability, average consequences, worst-case
consequences, benefits, and whether the populace consents to the risk or it is imposed on
them unilaterally).
162. Id.; see also Applegate, supra note 152, at 1655 ("[T]he results of risk assessments
usually depend on the way that the uncertainties are resolved.").
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and may even dominate, many of the choices made in conducting a risk
assessment." 1
63
Another critic notes that certain questions cannot even be answered by
scientific risk assessments in the first place because there are "trans-
scientific" gaps in knowledge upon which scientists cannot even perform
experiments. 164 Where measuring the health effects of risks with highly
uncertain lower limits, "policy considerations must fill in the gaps that
science cannot inform."' 165 While these policy assumptions can strongly
affect the agency's final decision, agencies often cloak their decisions in
science, "leaving no trace of the policy compromise that formed the basis
for the standard." 166 "Science has considerable rhetorical appeal" and is
considered to be "objective" by the public, so expressing policy judgments
as scientific conclusions can make the agency look "highly credible if not
even infallible."' 167 Thus, an agency's lack of explicitness regarding the
uncertainties involved in a decision and the policy decisions that helped
resolve those uncertainties into a decision may prevent the public from
reviewing the true bases for the agency's action.168
ii. The NEPA Context
In the NEPA context, critics have pointed out that instead of producing
EISs of high scientific quality in the form of nuanced risk assessments and
cost-benefit analysis, federal agencies often turn in EISs with inadequate,
incomplete, and often misinterpreted data. 169 In addition, each agency is
permitted to structure its EIS how it sees fit, leading to a mix of different
methodologies rather than one formal methodology, such as the Ecological
Risk Assessments championed by the EPA. 170 Moreover, studies have
163. Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in
Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1279-80 (2004).
164. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1613, 1619-21 (1995).
165. Id. at 1622.
166. Id. at 1640.
167. Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 163, at 1264.
168. See Wagner, supra note 164, at 1686.
169. See S.M. Bartell, Ecology, Environmental Impact Statements, and Ecological Risk
Assessment: A Brief Historical Perspective, 4 HuM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 843,
844 (1998); Sonja Klopf, Nada Wolff Culver & Pete Morton, A Road Map to a Better
NEPA: Why Environmental Risk Assessments Should Be Used To Analyze the
Environmental Consequences of Complex Federal Actions, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y,
Fall 2007, at 38, 38. See generally Farber, supra note 54 (criticizing the general treatment of
risk under NEPA).
170. See Klopf, Culver & Morton, supra note 169, at 38-39. These authors note that
ecological risk assessment provides a methodological framework that is conceptually built to
deal with uncertainty and risk when analyzing environmental impacts. Id. at 39. In addition,
they note that the steps of an ecological risk assessment, including problem formulation and
risk characterization, closely mirror the requirements of an EIS. See id. at 39-40; see also
Bartell, supra note 169, at 845, 848 (noting that ecological risk assessment "moves
uncertainty explicitly to the forefront and makes every attempt to quantify such
uncertainties," but is also designed to include qualitative aspects in the decision-making
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shown that EIS predictions are often too vague to be tested at all, and when
they can be verified, "fewer than one out of three [are] substantially
accurate." 17
1
Due to the fact that NEPA does not require agencies to perform later
checks on their predictions, agencies are likely to be averse to discussing
the shortcomings of the proposed action. 172  Professor Daniel Farber
recommends that agencies avoid using flat probabilities without a
discussion of the uncertainties involved provide more explicit discussion of
the methodologies or models used, the reasons for choosing a particular
model, and attendant assumptions in using a model. 173 Due to the inherent
assumptions and uncertainties involved in making predictions based on
models, Professor Farber argues that "there can be no clear dichotomy
between cases of quantifiable risks and non-quantifiable uncertainty"
because there is always the possibility that the model does not apply or that
previous empirical assumptions are incorrect. 174 Finally, Professor Farber
argues that even if the agency believes the probability of a catastrophic
outcome to be very low, the potential for such outcomes should at least be
noted in the EIS. 175
c. The Problem of Terrorism
Terrorism presents certain unique problems in risk assessment and risk
management. First, terrorist activity is largely stochastic, or random; unlike
many other risks, it is thus extremely hard to model, making probability
estimates very difficult, if not impossible.1 76 In addition, the obvious
secrecy of terrorist plans and the extremely "wide range of potential means
and targets to choose among" are devastating to attempts at risk
assessment. 177 Thus, "all that experts on terrorism are able to do, and even
then only with a large error term, is to rank . . . threats by relative
context). Of course, ecological risk assessments may still be subject to many of the
criticisms of risk assessment listed above.
171. Farber, supra note 54, at 28.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 29.
174. Id. at 30.
175. Id. at 31. Professor Daniel Farber concludes that for purposes of analyzing
catastrophic risk under NEPA, "[t]he quantifiability of the risk should not be relevant." Id.
176. See NAT'L RESSEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., SAFETY AND SECURITY OF
COMMERCIAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE: PUBLIC REPORT 6 (2006) [hereinafter SPENT
FUEL STORAGE REPORT] ("Spent fuel storage facilities cannot be dismissed as targets for...
attacks because it is not possible to predict the behavior and motivations of terrorists .... );
RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 174-75 (2004) (noting that
bioterrorism presents a "stubborn challenge" to cost-benefit analysis, partly because "science
cannot predict where or when bioterrorists will strike").
177. POSNER, supra note 176, at 174; see SPENT FUEL STORAGE REPORT, supra note 176,
at 26 (noting that experts have not been able to apply probabilistic risk assessment to
terrorist attacks because the probability of any given attack depends upon "impossible-to-
quantify factors such as terrorist motivations, expertise, and access to technical means
[and] ... on the effectiveness of measures that might prevent or mitigate such attacks").
2010] 3029
3030 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78
likelihood" rather than absolute probabilities. 178 Thus, risk assessors face
an extremely large degree of uncertainty when attempting to express the
risk of terrorism in the form of probabilities.
Terrorism is also dramatic, unfamiliar, clustered (a large number of
deaths occurring in one place at one time), and extremely hard to control. 179
In conjunction, these factors tend to produce among the populace strong
emotions-most notably fear-which are likely to produce "a range of
other costs, in the form of countless ripple effects."' 180 The costs of these
secondary ripple effects may not easily be weighed in a standard cost-
benefit analysis that assesses lives lost or physical damage done. 181
Terrorism is thus best categorized as a "new risk" rather than a "historical
risk" and is likely to cause citizens to demand a high degree of risk
aversion. 182 Even if one were to categorize terrorist attacks as a low-
probability risk, public reaction (or overreaction) to these risks is a cost in
and of itself,183 and it is plausible to argue that the government should
overregulate terrorist risks in an attempt to lower these secondary costs. 184
2. The Precautionary Principle
a. General Approaches
Stemming from the perceived failure of traditional risk assessment or
cost-benefit analysis to deal with risk of events that have rarely, if ever,
occurred and with which we have little or no experience, it has become
popular among policymakers to invoke the Precautionary Principle
178. POSNER, supra note 176, at 174-75.
179. See Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, in THE RISKS OF
TERRORISM 23, 23-24 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2003); W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser,
Sacrificing Civil Liberties To Reduce Terrorism Risks, in THE RISKS OF TERRORISM, supra, at
1-2.
180. Sunstein, supra note 179, at 24; see also SPENT FUEL STORAGE REPORT, supra note
176, at 12 (noting that concerns about nuclear power plants have "added stakes" because
many people fear radiation more than they do other serious risks, "ampliflying] the concern
over a potential terrorist attack ... beyond the physical injuries it might cause, and beyond
the economic costs of the cleanup").
181. See Sunstein, supra note 179, at 23-24.
182. See id. at 24 ("The purpose and effect of terrorism are to make people fear that 'they
cannot be safe anywhere.').
183. Id.
184. See id. at 34-35. Professor Sunstein notes that the secondary costs of terrorist
attacks, or merely the fear of terrorism, warrant an "emotion premium" beyond the
discounted value of the risk. See id. at 28-30. It is important to note the distinction between
this point and the Metropolitan Edison Court's point that secondary, nonenvironmental
effects should not be discussed under NEPA. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
Professor Sunstein's point may help emphasize that the effects of a terrorist attack are
sufficiently severe to fall within the "reasonably close causal relationship" framework, but
the NEPA document itself need not contain a detailed assessment of these secondary costs; it
may only discuss the environmental effects of a terrorist attack. See supra notes 74-75 and
accompanying text.
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(Principle) in instances of uncertainty. 185 This approach is potentially
useful for assessing the risk of terrorism, which is inherently uncertain but
potentially serious, under NEPA. Weaker versions of the Principle hold
that uncertainty regarding adverse environmental impacts of an activity
should be taken into account when deciding whether to prohibit or regulate
the activity, while stronger versions assert that uncertainty "provides an
affirmative justification for regulating an activity or regulating it more
stringently than in the absence of uncertainty."'186  The three main
components of the Principle are a threat of harm, uncertainty of impacts and
causality, and a precautionary response. 187 However, these components
raise several interpretative issues, such as what kind of harm counts as a
sufficient "threat," what level of uncertainty is needed to trigger the
Principle, and what constitutes a sufficient precautionary measure. 188
Professor Richard B. Stewart describes four main versions of the
Principle. 189  First, the "Non-Preclusion" version holds that scientific
uncertainty should not automatically preclude regulation of activities that
pose a significant risk of harm.' 90 This version of the Principle more
closely resembles traditional risk management, in that it would not restrict
the risk factors (including economic risks) that regulators can take into
account. 191 It would also merely be one option for regulators to consider on
a case-by-case basis.192 Second, the "Margin of Safety" version posits that
regulatory controls should contain a margin of safety to account for large
margins of error and uncertainty in evaluating the probability and severity
of a specific risk.193
Third, under the "Best Available Technology" version, activities with a
large degree of uncertainty and the potential for a significant amount of
harm should be subject to the best technology available to minimize the
risks of this harm. 194 Fourth, the "Prohibitory," or strong, version, states
that an activity with an uncertain potential for significant harm should be
185. WILSON & CROUCH, supra note 131, at 159; see also Stewart, supra note 138, at 75
(noting that advocates of the Principle criticize prevailing methods that require regulators to
prove a high probability of serious harm before regulatory controls are adopted). See
generally Gardiner, supra note 121 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of different
versions of the Precautionary Principle).
186. Stewart, supra note 138, at 71-72.
187. Gardiner, supra note 121, at 36.
188. Id.
189. See infra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
190. Stewart, supra note 138, at 76; see also Gardiner, supra note 121, at 43 (engaging in
a similar analysis).
191. Gardiner, supra note 121, at 43-44 (emphasizing that the practical importance of the
Non-Preclusion version would be to provide some authoritative, rhetorical, ex post
justification when environmental risks happen to be weighed heavily).
192. Id.
193. Stewart, supra note 138, at 76-77.
194. Id. at76.
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flatly prohibited unless the proponent of the activity can show that it
"presents no appreciable risk of harm."' 95
b. Criticism
There is often a double-edged criticism of the Principle.' 96 On one hand,
the weak versions of the Principle can be vacuous. 197 While these versions
of the Principle may sound desirable in theory, they would have little
independent power as decision-making tools in practice.' 98 If regulators
were permitted to juggle nonenvironmental costs and benefits any way they
pleased, the process would look extremely similar to risk management, and
the Principle would just be an unnecessary flourish. 199 Thus, the weaker
versions "offer[] us no reasons to believe that they will actually do anything
to protect the environment. '200
However, a stronger Principle is often criticized on the grounds of being
extreme and excessively narrow.20 1  Critics are not comfortable with
environmental effects being given determinative preference over other
variables, such as economic factors. 20 2 In addition, a stronger Principle can
lead to unnecessary worst-case presumptions and "a disproportionate
allocation of limited regulatory resources." 20 3 It may also have the perverse
effect of encouraging regulators to understate uncertainty for fear of
triggering the Principle.204 In addition, a stringent focus on regulating
activities with a higher degree of environmental uncertainty may cause a
shift away from regulating more obvious, known environmental risks. 20 5
Thus, the Principle cannot be so weak that it has no independent power over
decision making, yet it cannot be so strong that it takes precedence in nearly
every situation with environmental risks.20 6
195. Id.; see also Sunstein, supra note 122, at 849 (noting that the strong version
effectively shifts the regulatory burden of proof from the public to the regulators).
196. Gardiner, supra note 121, at 39.
197. See id. at 44.
198. See id. at 43.
199. See id.; see also Stewart, supra note 138, at 77 (noting that weak versions "do not
represent or justify any basic change in the preventive approach to regulation that has
generally prevailed over the past 30 years").
200. Gardiner, supra note 121, at 42.
201. Id. at 45.
202. See id.
203. See Stewart, supra note 138, at 97.
204. Id. at 98.
205. See id. at 97; see also Sunstein, supra note 122, at 852 (noting that regulation based
upon the Principle can sometimes give rise to "'substitute risks"').
206. See Gardiner, supra note 121, at 38-39 (indicating the need for a more concrete
Precautionary Principle that sharply defines the threats and types of uncertainty that should
trigger the precautionary response).
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3. The Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle
Thus, while many scholars think traditional risk assessment undervalues
uncertain but potentially catastrophic harms by categorizing them as mere
low-probability harms, the Principle's attempt to fix this problem has also
been criticized, either because it is too vague or too stringent. Nonetheless,
under circumstances with the potential for catastrophic harm, people are
especially risk averse. 207 In these cases, the argument goes, the traditional
expected value formulation is insufficient because it undervalues the extra
costs that come with catastrophic harm. 20 8
Professor Cass Sunstein argues that there is a tendency among human
beings to treat uncertain risks as if they were low-probability risks, and in
risk assessment, to treat low-probability risks as if they were essentially
zero. 209 However, the concept of uncertainty presupposes that one cannot
assign probabilities, so an assumption that uncertain risks are low
probability is unwarranted. 210 In addition, there are often "secondary" costs
of catastrophe, such as social losses or disruption "that can greatly outrun
the initial effect of that event. '211  Without a built-in risk premium,
traditional risk assessment and expected utility analysis may be insufficient
to account for the magnitude of danger associated with catastrophic
harm. 2 12
With these concerns in mind, Professor Sunstein formulated the
Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, "a form of risk aversion for the
most dangerous risks." 213 The Principle holds that in situations involving
uncertain dangers of catastrophe, regulators should act to prevent the worst-
case scenario when the costs of reducing these dangers are not huge and
incurring costs does not substantially divert resources from extremely
pressing problems. 214 Under this more limited conception of the Principle,
where there is a real possibility of catastrophe and little reliable information
about its likelihood, regulating might be more prudent than simply running
207. See Sunstein, supra note 122, at 843.
208. See id. at 870; see also Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity
Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 145, 146 (2003) (arguing
that "it is reasonably foreseeable that non-reasonably foreseeable events will occur from time
to time" and "[a] planning process that ignores this reality will work satisfactorily nearly all
of the time but when failures occur they may be catastrophic").
209. Sunstein, supra note 122, at 870-71. Professor Sunstein notes that "human beings
often neglect low-probability, high-harm risks, especially if the costs would be incurred
immediately and if the benefits would not be realized until the distant future." Id. at 872.
210. Seeid. at 876.
211. Id. at 873; see also SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 130, at 94.
212. See Sunstein, supra note 122, at 874.
213. Id. at 893.
214. Id. Professor Sunstein borrows much of his formulation from John Rawls's
"maximin principle," which holds that regulators should choose the policy with the best
worst-case outcome if (a) outcomes are potentially catastrophic, (b) probabilities cannot be
assigned, and (c) regulating this way is a relative matter of cost indifference. See id. at 880
(citing JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 134-35 (rev. ed. 1999)); Gardiner, supra note
121, at 47.
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the risk.215 Professor Sunstein and Professor Stephen M. Gardiner both
qualify this statement by noting that the mere possibility of catastrophic
harm should not be sufficient to trigger the Principle; instead, there must be
some minimum standard of realistic plausibility concerning the catastrophic
outcome. 216  Thus, the questions to ask in deciding whether the
Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle should apply to a given situation
are as follows: "(a) How bad is the worst case scenario, compared to other
bad outcomes? (b) What, exactly, is lost by choosing maximin?" 217 If the
worst-case scenario is much worse than other bad outcomes and it costs
relatively little to choose a specific regulatory approach to minimize the
possibility of this outcome under the maximin principle, then the case for
applying this version of the Principle is presumably strengthened. 218 Thus,
if one were to consider the risk of a terrorist attack on a nuclear plant
uncertain yet plausible and potentially catastrophic, the Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary Principle would mandate taking all reasonable regulatory
steps to mitigate the chance of the worst possible consequences or effects of
an attack.219
II. DOES THE RISK OF TERRORISM FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF NEPA?
As Part I indicated, courts have not dealt extensively with terrorism
under NEPA until relatively recently. 220 In addition, as discussed in Part I,
courts that have considered the issue of reactor sabotage have generally
been one-sided, dismissing the possibility that the risk of a terrorist attack
should be considered under NEPA.221 Part II dissects the major arguments
in favor of, and in opposition to, analyzing the risk of a terrorist attack
under NEPA. This part includes arguments made by the parties to the
major cases, scholars, and commentators, but will focus on the circuit court
opinions. Part II.A discusses the Ninth Circuit opinion, which held that the
NRC could not dismiss the possibility of a terrorist attack under NEPA
review as a matter of law. Part II.B discusses the Third Circuit opinion,
which agreed with the NRC's position that the risk of an attack is too
attenuated to warrant consideration under NEPA.
215. Gardiner, supra note 121, at 49.
216. Id. at 51; Sunstein, supra note 122, at 880. Professor Sunstein lists global warming,
genetic modification of food, and, importantly, nuclear power and terrorism as examples of
instances when the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle can be plausibly and
realistically justified. See id. at 874, 880, 892.
217. Sunstein, supra note 122, at 889; see supra note 214 (discussing maximin principle).
218. See Sunstein, supra note 122, at 890.
219. See id. at 876-77 (noting that the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle can be
applied to the risks of terrorism and nuclear energy).
220. See Farber, supra note 54, at 12 (noting that courts have begun to address this issue
in detail after the terrorist attacks of September 11).
221. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.2.
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A. The Ninth Circuit Departs from the Prevailing Wisdom: San Luis
Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit rejected the NRC's approach to addressing
terrorism in the NEPA context in San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.222 In this case, the court considered
whether the NRC had to take into account the possibility of a terrorist attack
in a NEPA review of a proposal for additional spent fuel storage space at a
nuclear power plant.223 The petitioners argued that the terrorist attacks of
September 11 resulted in increased concern that reactors and spent fuel
pools would not be able to withstand aircraft attacks. 224  They were
especially worried in light of the vulnerabilities of nuclear plants and the
fact that terrorist groups consider nuclear plants desirable targets. 225 They
concluded that the NRC's assertion that it has enhanced security at nuclear
plants after September 11 essentially concedes that the agency considers the
risk of an attack foreseeable and is able to analyze it, at least
qualitatively. 226
In addition, they made clear that they did not merely seek a discussion of
a speculative worst-case scenario, but "'a full discussion of the potential
consequences of a range of credible events involving destructive acts of
malice or insanity against the proposed [installation].' ' 227 The petitioners
also rebutted the NRC's assertion that the NEPA process is an inappropriate
forum for discussion of terrorism. 228 They noted that the NRC can still
"solicit public comment" while limiting public access to sensitive
information in the final document, and, in any case, other agencies have
often prepared EISs containing some information inaccessible to the general
public. 229
Finally, the petitioners noted that the NRC's duty to protect the public
health and safety under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) is distinct from the
requirement to publicly "consider and attempt to avoid or mitigate the
environmental impacts" under NEPA, and thus "compliance with the AEA
does not excuse compliance with NEPA.' '230 Thus, the petitioners sought
an EIS that contained evidence of the plant's vulnerabilities, the potential
consequences of an attack, and design features implemented to avoid or
mitigate the vulnerabilities.231
222. 449 F.3d 1016, 1035 (9th Cir. 2006).
223. Id. at 1019-21.
224. See Brief for Petitioners at 35-36, Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d 1016 (No. 03-
74628).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 41-42, 45.
227. Id. at 48 (quoting Contentions at 28, Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d 1016 (No. 03-
74628)).
228. Id. at 51-52.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 54-55.
231. See id. at 55.
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The NRC and the nuclear plant operator Pacific Gas & Electric Company
(PG&E) relied heavily on the reasoning in PFS232 to support their
argument. Besides the PFS four-part analysis, the respondents also noted
that the AEA was the proper place for the NRC to generally assess "security
threats" such as terrorism. 233 They also argued that it would stretch the
scope of NEPA to address these threats again in individual licensing actions
under NEPA. 234 They emphasized that the NRC's treatment of terrorism
under the AEA does not necessarily compel a NEPA analysis because the
agency's actions under the AEA, such as plant security improvements,
essentially make the risk of actual harm from an attack "remote and
speculative." 235
They also noted that nothing in NEPA or its legislative history indicates
an intention to address issues such as terrorism. 236 Moreover, they argued
that a NEPA analysis of terrorism could paralyze agency decision making
"to the limits of the imagination." 237 This is because it would be unclear
how to assess the risk outside the context of probabilistic risk assessment
and how to determine the number of potential mitigation measures that
would need to be reviewed.238 Finally, they concluded that the addition of
storage space does not trigger a NEPA responsibility because the risk of
terrorism is caused by uncertain terrorist motivations that already exist, not
the NRC's licensing decision. 239
Since the respondents based many of their arguments on PFS, the court
took pains to rebut all four rationales relied upon by the NRC in this
decision.240  First, the court addressed the Commission's reliance on
Metropolitan Edison by distinguishing between that case and the case
before it. 24 1 It noted that there was a chain of three events in Metropolitan
Edison: "(1) a major federal action; (2) a change in the physical
environment; and (3) an effect. ' 242 The court concluded that Metropolitan
Edison was dealing with the relationship between events two and three: the
change in the physical environment (the increased risk of nuclear accident)
and a secondary, indirect effect (psychological harm on the community). 243
232. 56 N.R.C. 340 (2002); see supra notes 98-119 and accompanying text.
233. See Answering Brief of Respondent-Intervenor Pacific Gas and Electric Co. at 17-
18, 22-23, Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d 1016 (No. 03-74628).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 43-44.
236. Id. at 25-26.
237. Id. at 32.
238. See id. at 31-32.
239. See id. at 37.
240. For a discussion of these four rationales, see supra notes 103-19 and accompanying
text.
241. See Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1029.
242. Id. For purposes of this case, event one would be the addition of storage space,
event two would be a terrorist attack resulting from this additional storage space (discounted
by the element of risk), and event three would be secondary, indirect effects of this increased
risk, such as the psychological fears at issue in Metropolitan Edison.
243. Id.
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In contrast, the challenge before the Mothers for Peace court concerned the
relationship between events one and two: the major federal action (the
addition of storage space) and the change in the physical environment (the
risk of a terrorist attack).244 Thus, the question was whether a terrorist
attack itself (and its attendant environmental impacts), not indirect effects
resulting from the mere risk of this attack, was "'remote and highly
speculative."' 245 The court then concluded that the NRC's contention that
the risk is remote and highly speculative is inconsistent with the
government's extensive efforts to combat terrorism after the terrorist attacks
of September 11, especially at nuclear power plants.246 Given these efforts,
it concluded that the risk cannot be determined "'remote and highly
speculative"' as a matter of law. 247
Second, the court held that the NRC's assertion that the risk of a terrorist
attack is unquantifiable is not determinative because NEPA does not require
numeric quantification. 248 Instead of addressing probability, an EIS can
244. Id. at 1030. The Mothers for Peace court based its reasoning on No Gwen Alliance
v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988).
245. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1029-30 (quoting Warm Springs Dam Task Force v.
Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 1980)). The court also finds a quote from
Metropolitan Edison itself to support this proposition: "[W]e are considering effects caused
by the risk of accident. The situation where an agency is asked to consider effects that will
occur if a risk is realized, for example, if an accident occurs ... is an entirely different case."
Id. at 1029 (quoting Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 775
n.9 (1983)). Thus, according to this reasoning, while there may not be a "reasonably close
causal relationship" between a major federal action and the psychological effects caused by
the perception of a risk of an accident, there certainly is a reasonably close causal
relationship between a major federal action and a terrorist attack itself. See supra notes 74-
75 and accompanying text. Since the causal relationship is reasonably close, the NRC is
required to analyze the potential environmental effects of an attack. See Farber, supra note
54, at 24 (noting that CEQ's NEPA regulations define "reasonably foreseeable" to include
impacts that are catastrophic in nature, even if their probability of occurrence is low, as long
as the analysis of the impacts is within a "rule of reason"); Doremus, supra note 80 (arguing
that Metropolitan Edison cannot stand for the proposition that "environmental risks, that is
environmental impacts that are not certain to occur, are beyond the scope of NEPA
analysis").
246. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1030-31 (detailing some aspects of the NRC's "'top
to bottom"' security review against the risk of a terrorist attack); see also Mott, supra note
32, at 350 (noting that after the terrorist attacks of September 11, the NRC has required
nuclear power plants to "operate at the highest level of security, as well as to implement
numerous security measures"). The court also noted that even before September 11, the
agency "required analysis of means and methods of hypothetical attacks against specific
f -cilitics, with the goal of establishing effective counter-measures." Mothers for Peace, 449
F.3d at 1031 n.8.
247. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1031; see also SPENT FUEL STORAGE REPORT, supra
note 176, at 6 (noting that "attacks by knowledgeable terrorists with access to appropriate
technical means are possible"); id. at 30 (stating that the proven ability of terrorists to recruit
or train attackers and bring them to the United States combined with the willingness of
terrorists to carry out suicide attacks "greatly expands the scenarios that need to be
considered when analyzing potential threats"); Mott, supra note 32, at 352 (noting that there
are "numerous feasible scenarios" for an attack and that the probability of such an attack has
increased since the terrorist attacks of September 11).
248. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1031; see also Farber, supra note 54, at 12 (agreeing
that NEPA does not require quantification and noting that many environmental impacts are
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address qualitative factors, such as likely modes of attack, particular
vulnerabilities of the specific plant, and a range of consequences. 249 The
court also noted that the NRC's insistence that it has performed a "'top to
bottom"' terrorism review outside of the NEPA context is at odds with its
assertion that precise quantification is impossible; thus, the Commission has
not established that the risk actually is unquantifiable. 250
Third, while the NRC is correct in determining that it does not have to
perform a worst-case analysis, considering the risk of a terrorist attack does
not necessarily amount to a worst-case analysis. 251 The court cited the
amended CEQ regulations, which still require agencies to address
uncertainties by detailing reasonably foreseeable significant adverse
impacts, including low-probability but potentially catastrophic events.252 It
then noted that the petitioners were not calling for a worst-case analysis, but
instead an analysis of a range of environmental impacts likely to occur in
the event of a terrorist attack.253
difficult to quantify). The National Research Council, in a report prepared for Congress on
the safety of spent fuel storage, also noted that since the behavior and motivations of
terrorists are inherently uncertain and since terrorists view nuclear power plants as "desirable
targets," the risk of such an attack cannot be dismissed. SPENT FUEL STORAGE REPORT, supra
note 176, at 6. Significantly, the report also referenced the "well known public dread of
radiation" as another reason why the threat cannot be dismissed. Id.
249. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1031; see also SPENT FUEL STORAGE REPORT, supra
note 176, at 29 (noting that numerous different methods of attack, including air attacks,
ground attacks, and theft of spent nuclear fuel, are possible); id. at 27 (noting that the
National Research Council could not address the risk of terrorist attacks on spent fuel storage
pools using quantitative risk assessment, but instead decided "to examine a range of possible
terrorist attack scenarios in terms of (1) their potential for damaging spent fuel pools ... and
(2) their potential for radioactive material releases"). The court noted that the NRC has
provided for consideration of uncertain risks with methods other than quantitative risk
assessment in non-NEPA contexts. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1031.
250. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1032. But see Farber, supra note 54, at 13 (noting
that the small sample size of major terrorist attacks would probably make attempts at
quantification too subjective, thus making a more qualitative discussion more useful to the
public). Nonetheless, Professor Farber later goes on to recommend that agencies consider
catastrophic outcomes "whenever there is a credible argument that they are possible." Id. at
31. Professor Farber also argues that the fact that "quantifiability" is difficult should not
preclude a discussion of the potential for such outcomes, nor should it preclude "the
possibility of including higher margins of safety or other precautions" for catastrophic
possibilities. Id.; see also Petitioners' Brief and Special Appendix at 47-48, New York v.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 589 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 08-3903-ag(L))
[hereinafter N.Y. Brief] (noting incongruity between the NRC's insistence on its extensive
mitigation measures to combat terrorist attacks and its stance that the risk of an attack is too
remote for NEPA purposes).
251. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1032-33; see also Mott, supra note 32, at 354
(noting that while prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11 a major terrorist attack on a
nuclear power plant might have been considered a speculative worst-case scenario, we know
now that terrorist camps, including those involved in the September 11 attacks, consider
nuclear plants primary targets).
252. See Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1033 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22); see also
Farber, supra note 54, at 21-27 (discussing the "rise and fall" of the worst-case scenario in
the NEPA regulations).
253. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1034.
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Finally, in addressing the national security issue, the court determined
that Weinberger could only stand for the proposition that while NEPA
procedures can be limited or modified when dealing with sensitive security
issues, there is no basis for the claim that an agency can simply avoid
NEPA altogether.254 It noted that while the public participation aim of
NEPA may be limited when the public cannot access the EIS, this does not
necessarily foreclose all aspects of public involvement, such as the public
"contributing information to the decisionmaking process." 255  The court
thus bluntly stated that "[t]here is no 'national defense' exception to
NEPA. ' '256 However, the court did not prescribe a method by which NEPA
could be modified to strike a balance between the protection of sensitive
national security information and the polices behind the statute, including
ensuring that agencies take a hard look at environmental impacts and
involve the public in the decision. 257 Several scholars have advocated
methods by which NEPA's goals can be fulfilled while sensitive
information is shielded from the public, such as in camera judicial review,
congressional oversight, and EISs that disclose the potential effects of
contemplated actions but not the specific details of the project. 258
B. The Third Circuit Reaffirms the Traditional Approach: New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
The Third Circuit recently came to the opposite conclusion in New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.259 This case involved relicensing proceedings for Oyster
Creek Nuclear Generating Station.260 The NRC, as part of its license
renewal policy, concluded that some environmental impacts, such as the
risk of sabotage, could be analyzed in a Generic Environmental Impact
Statement (GEIS), a document that addresses issues "common to all nuclear
254. Id.; see Lucinda Low Swartz, NEPA in an Age of Terrorism, 5 ENVTL. PRAc. 346,
347-48 (2003), available at http://lucindalowswartz.com/images/NEPAAgeTerrorism.pdf
(noting that while EIS preparers should be sensitive to the fact that EISs should not be
published with exacting detail about facilities and precise methods in which facilities could
be destroyed, affected members of the public still have a right to know whether they can be
affected and the extent of environmental impacts that may occur). Swartz also notes that
"[t]he consequences of a potential event are important to understanding the extent of
environmental impacts; the causes of such events are not." Id. at 348.
255. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1034.
256. Id. at 1034-35 (quoting No Gwen Alliance v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th
Cir. 1988)); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(c) (2009) (stating that EISs can be safeguarded from
public dissemination through the use of classified annexes, but that unclassified portions
should still be made available to the public); Swartz, supra note 254, at 347 (noting that
although there are NEPA provisions for reacting in an emergency and preparing classified
annexes, there is no general national security exemption).
257. See Joseph Farris, Note, Mothers for Peace and the Need To Develop Classified
NEPA Procedures, 34 EcOLOGY L.Q. 955, 965 (2007).
258. See id. at 969-73 (summarizing methods advocated by various scholars).
259. 561 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009).
260. Id. at 135.
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plants."2 61 In the GEIS, the NRC noted that the risk of sabotage was small
and no worse than the effects of severe accidents; thus, it did not address
the risk of sabotage in detail and on a site-specific basis. 262 The NRC's
arguments for failing to discuss terrorism in detail in a site-specific EIS
were similar to the reasoning employed in PFS263 and Mothers for
Peace,264 but it also introduced some additional arguments. It concluded
that there was no proximate-cause link between the relicensing action and
third-party criminal activity; "[i]nstead, the level of risk depends upon
political, social, and economic factors external to the NRC licensing
process." 265  It also noted that this proximate cause link was especially
weak when the proposed action was the mere relicensing of an existing
plant, rather than the addition of new storage space, as was the case in
Mothers for Peace.266 Finally, it argued that the conclusion in the GEIS
that the potential damage from terrorism would be no worse than that of a
severe accident was sufficient for NEPA purposes. 267
The petitioners contended that the risk of a terrorist attack should have
been addressed in detail in a site-specific EIS and that the risk required
consideration distinct from consideration of severe accidents. 268  The
petitioners emphasized that the risk was foreseeable given the September 11
attacks and the plant's proximity to urban centers. 269
The petitioners argued that compliance with the AEA is distinct from
compliance with NEPA,270 but that the NRC's focus on combating
terrorism under the AEA did lend credence to the idea that the agency
considers the risk foreseeable. 271 They contended that compliance with
NEPA was not "superfluous" after compliance with the AEA because
NEPA addresses environmental impacts in a public setting, which the AEA
does not.272 In addition, a generic review in a GEIS does not take into
261. Id. at 134. Site-specific EISs, on the other hand, discuss issues the NRC considers
unique and specific to the particular plant. See id. at 134-35.
262. Id. The NRC also concluded that an analysis of mitigation alternatives for core melt
sequences likely to result from a terrorist attack were "important and ongoing," but "outside
the scope of NEPA in general and of license renewal in particular." Id. at 135.
263. See supra notes 98-119 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 233-39 and accompanying text.
265. Amergen Energy Co., 65 N.R.C. 124, 130 (2007).
266. See id. at 130 n.25.
267. See id. at 131-32.
268. See N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 561 F.3d 132,
135 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that petitioners specifically sought a design base threat analysis,
which is used to design safeguard systems to protect against acts of sabotage, and "an
analysis of mitigation alternatives for core melt sequences likely to result from an aircraft
attack").
269. Id. at 137.
270. Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Petitioner at 27, N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 561
F.3d 132 (No. 07-2271); see also id. at 45 (noting that compliance with NEPA is "required
'unless specifically excluded by statute or other existing law,"' something which the AEA
does not specifically call for (quoting Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 869 F.2d 719, 729 (3d Cir. 1989))).
271. Id. at 8.
272. Id. at 46-47.
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account the particular design of the plant and its location to nearby
population centers; thus, they argued that a site-specific NEPA review
would be more appropriate. 273
The petitioners also rebutted the NRC's proximate-cause argument by
arguing that the NRC is charged with ensuring the environmental safety of
its facilities, 274 and thus its decision to relicense a plant or implement a
given mitigation measure will affect the risk of terrorism and its attendant
environmental impacts.275 Moreover, they argued that intentional acts of
third parties do not break the causal chain if they are sufficiently
foreseeable. 276 They thus concluded that the risk of terrorism on a nuclear
facility, especially given "the potentially devastating effects of an
attack,"277 was sufficiently foreseeable to warrant discussion under
NEPA.278 Finally, they noted that the purposes of NEPA could be served
even when some of the EIS contains sensitive, nonpublic information. 279
In its opinion, the court first favorably cited the court's assertions in
Metropolitan Edison that a "'manageable line"' 280 needs to be drawn to
limit an agency's responsibility under NEPA and that this line should
correspond with the agency's area of control. 281 In Metropolitan Edison,
the NRC could only control construction of the plant, not the public's
reaction; likewise, in this case, the NRC could not control the airspace
above its facility or the intervening conduct of a terrorist.282 Therefore, the
intervening events that would need to occur between relicensing and
sabotage, including third-party criminal conduct and the failure of another
agency to prevent an attack, lengthen the causal chain beyond a
"'reasonably close causal relationship.' 283
273. Id. at 47.
274. Id. at 33.
275. See id. at 42-43.
276. Id. at 34.
277. See Reply Brief on Behalf of Petitioner at 10, N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d
132 (No. 07-2271).
278. See Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Petitioner, supra note 270, at 35.
279. Id. at 50.
280. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139 (quoting Metro. Edison Co. v. People
Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 n.7 (1983)); see supra notes 73-80 and
accompanying text.
281. N.J. Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 139.
282. Id. at 139-40 (noting that the threat of an airborne terrorist attack is within the
jurisdiction of the Federal Aviation Administration and that NEPA does not authorize one
agency to usurp the nonenvironmental regulatory burdens of another agency). The court also
cited Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004), which stands for
the proposition that an agency need not discuss a particular environmental effect in an EIS
when it does not have the administrative power to stop the precipitating cause of this effect.
See N.J. Dep 't of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 138-39. But see N.Y. Brief, supra note 250, at 51
(noting that regardless of the NRC's authority to prevent an attack, it certainly has authority
to prevent or mitigate the effects of an attack); Doremus, supra note 80 (arguing that where
the NRC "allows nuclear plants to operate, and under what conditions, can affect the extent
to which terrorists target a particular location and the consequences should a terrorist strike
succeed").
283. N.J. Dep 't ofEnvtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 140.
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In supporting this conclusion, the court likened the "'reasonably close
causal relationship"' test to the tort doctrine of proximate cause.284
According to the court, intervening criminal conduct is a superseding cause
unless the original actor realized or should have realized the likelihood of
both the opportunity for and occurrence of criminal conduct.285 The court
stated that a terrorist attack "would certainly be 'extraordinary,' . . . any
terrorist would be operating independently of the NRC, the intervening
force would be due to a third-party terrorist, a terrorist attack is wrongful,
and the degree of culpability of the terrorist would far exceed that of the
NRC. ' 286 Thus, the rare, extraordinarily wrongful criminal conduct of a
terrorist attack would supersede any responsibility or liability on the part of
the NRC. 287
The court also noted that agency time and resources could be wasted or
spread too thin if it were required to consider security risks over which it
had limited control.288 Instead, to ensure that "a fully informed and well
considered decision is to be accomplished," the agency should focus its
resources on matters closer to its area of expertise. 289 Thus, many matters,
such as security assessments, can be centralized within a GEIS for reasons
of administrative efficiency rather than conducted on a site-specific basis
under NEPA. 290
In a second section, the court held that even if NEPA required review of
a terrorist risk, the GEIS sufficiently covered this risk by indicating that the
risk was small but impossible to quantify, and the effects of sabotage would
284. Id. at 140-42.
285. Id. at 140. The court listed several factors that weigh in favor of intervening terrorist
conduct superseding the original relicensing conduct, including when the intervening
conduct is independent of the original actor's negligence, caused by a third person's act, of
an extraordinary nature, and extremely wrongful or culpable. Id. at 140-41. However, the
court admitted that one factor, "whether the third party causes harm 'different in kind from
that which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence,"' cuts against the
NRC due to the conclusion that the effects of a terrorist attack would be similar to those of a
severe accident. Id. at 140 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442 (1965)).
286. Id. at 140-41.
287. Id. at 141. But see N.Y. Brief, supra note 250, at 50 (noting that the actions the NRC
has taken to prevent and mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack make the possibility that an
attack could occur reasonably foreseeable); Doremus, supra note 80 (arguing that the
analogy to tort law is inapplicable because "[t]ort liability looks backward to ask who should
have taken what actions to prevent a harm," while NEPA "looks forward to ask what the
consequences might be for human and environmental health if a federal agency takes,
authorizes, or funds an action").
288. N.J. Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 141.
289. Id. (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 774 n.7 (2004)). The
court noted that the NRC has broad discretion over managing the safety and security of
nuclear facilities, and it has used this discretion to implement substantial changes after the
terrorist attacks of September 11; nonetheless, Metropolitan Edison indicated that NEPA
obligations should be more limited and manageable. Id. at 142 n.9 (citing Metro. Edison Co.
v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 776 (1983)).
290. Id. at 141-42.
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be no worse than the effects of a severe accident. 291 The court thus rejected
petitioners' contention that there were specific risks at Oyster Creek that
made the risk of an attack larger than the NRC indicated in its GEIS.292
The court noted that while the "'mere assertion of unquantifiability"' did
not necessarily foreclose a NEPA analysis, the burden was on the
petitioners to demonstrate specifically a more meaningful way to analyze
and evaluate the risk of an attack.293
While the Third Circuit did not explicitly address the issue of national
security, some scholars have focused on the balance between "the public's
right to know and the need to protect sensitive information," both in the
context of terrorism and in general. 294 Supporters of the NRC's position in
PFS note that there is a very real risk that public disclosure of the
safeguards and vulnerabilities of a nuclear power plant can provide
terrorists with useful information on the best ways to attack a plant. 295 One
scholar notes that an agency's duty to comply with NEPA is inherently
limited by the agency's own authorizing legislation under the language of
NEPA itself.296 Thus, the AEA, which provides for protection of the
"'public health and safety"' and promotion of the "'common defense and
security,"' could arguably limit the NRC's duties under NEPA insofar as
the NEPA analysis conflicted with the NRC's duties under the AEA.297
Moreover, since public disclosure of NEPA documents are always subject
to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which has a
national security exemption, it follows that agencies can at least limit public
291. Id. at 143. But see Doremus, supra note 80 ("[T]he NRC should not be allowed to
say as a blanket matter that it need never consider the risks of terrorism in the environmental
analysis of its licensing decisions.").
292. N.J. Dep't of EnvtL Prot., 561 F.3d at 143. But see SPENT FUEL STORAGE REPORT,
supra note 176, at 8 ("The potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools to terrorist attacks are
plant-design specific. Therefore, specific vulnerabilities can be understood only by
examining the characteristics of. . . each plant.").
293. N.J. Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 144 (quoting Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 869 F.2d 719, 744 n.31 (3d Cir. 1989)). But see Farber,
supra note 54, at 14 (criticizing this approach as a "stubborn refusal to address the issue on
the merits [that] will only serve to undermine [the NRC's] credibility as a guardian of public
safety").
294. Frye, supra note 99, at 657. See generally Hope Babcock, National Security and
Environmental Laws: A Clear and Present Danger?, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 105 (2007)
(describing generally how national security interests and environmental laws have come into
conflict more frequently after September 11); CC Vassar, NRDC v. Winter: Is NEPA
impeding National Security Interests?, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 279 (2009) (discussing a
conflict between environmental groups and the Navy over whether NEPA requires
consideration of the potential effects of naval training exercises on marine mammals); Farris,
supra note 257.
295. See Frye, supra note 99, at 658-59.
296. See id. at 659. Frye notes that the language of NEPA explicitly reads that it should
be implemented using "'all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations
of national policy,"' and that the requirements are limited based on "'risk to health and
safety, or other undesirable or unintended consequences."' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(b)
(2000)).
297. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(b), (d), 2134(d), 2201(b), 2232(a),
2239(a)(l)(B)(ii)-iii)).
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disclosure of portions of EISs that include sensitive national security
information.298  Some commentators conclude that any discussion of
terrorism is subject to this FOIA national security exemption, and thus can
be rightly withheld from a public EIS. 299
III. WHY THE RISK OF A TERRORIST ATTACK SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
UNDER NEPA REVIEW
Part III synthesizes the concepts discussed in Parts I and II to resolve the
conflict. Part III.A focuses on NEPA's statutory and regulatory text, its
implementation among courts, especially the foundational Metropolitan
Edison case, and the policies underlying the statute. It argues that analysis
of the risk of terrorism is consistent with NEPA both in how it was
designed and how it has been interpreted. It also situates this argument
within the context of the foundational Metropolitan Edison decision, which
the Third Circuit used to rule that the risk of terrorism must be considered
under NEPA.
Part III.B focuses on the risk assessment literature and makes a
normative argument for considering the risk of terrorism under NEPA in
light of this literature. Part III.B. 1 first attempts to dissect the
methodologies underlying the circuit courts' decisions. It argues that the
two courts, while they do not explicitly endorse a specific risk assessment
methodology, nonetheless implicitly use principles gleaned from available
methodologies to decide which environmental risks fall within the scope of
NEPA. It also criticizes some of the methodological assumptions about risk
inherent in these decisions. Part III.B.2 then attempts to resolve the
methodological impasse by advocating a specific approach, the
Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, for analyzing uncertain risks of
catastrophic harm under NEPA. It argues that this approach, in conjunction
with the policies behind NEPA, provides a strong rationale for considering
the risk of terrorism under NEPA.
A. The Legal Context: Why NEPA's History and Implementation Is
Consistent with Considering the Risk of a Terrorist Attack
Courts have generally abided by the "twin aims" of NEPA: (1) to ensure
that an agency takes a "hard look" at significant environmental impacts in
its decision-making process and (2) to inform the public that the agency has
considered these impacts in its decision. 300 Thus, as the NEPA regulations
also make clear, the NEPA process should actually inform the agency's
decision-making process, not merely serve as an after-the-fact disclosure
document.301  With that in mind, this Note posits that several of the
298. See, e.g., Babcock, supra note 294, at 115; Farris, supra note 257, at 959.
299. Frye, supra note 99, at 664.
300. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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arguments that the risk of a terrorist attack should not be considered under
NEPA are flawed.
First, the NRC's argument that it has taken the risk of terrorism into
account outside of the NEPA context when improving the security and
mitigation plans of nuclear plants302 is irrelevant for the purposes of NEPA
itself. The point of an EIS is to assure the public, as well as other
government actors, that the agency did indeed take significant
environmental effects into account.30 3 If courts blindly accept at face value
the NRC's position that it has considered the risk of terrorism outside of
NEPA yet concluded that it is not significant enough to warrant discussion
under NEPA, then the aims of NEPA are undermined. NEPA requires
agencies to take significant environmental impacts into account in the
particular form of a public EIS. Thus, regardless of the NRC's terrorism
analyses outside of the NEPA context, its job is not finished until the public
is assured through the public NEPA process that the agency has considered
all significant environmental impacts.
Moreover, the NRC's blanket statement that the effects of a terrorist
attack are sufficiently similar to the effects of a severe accident 304 is a gross
simplification. As the NAS has stated, there are numerous potential modes
of terrorist attacks. 30 5 In addition, particular nuclear plants have their own
specific vulnerabilities, and, more importantly, concerns about the
environmental effects of a terrorist attack on the nearby population vary
greatly from plant to plant. For instance, the effects of a terrorist attack on
Indian Point Energy Center, which is located just twenty-four miles from
New York City, would be much different than the effects on a more isolated
plant.306
Since the modes of attack, vulnerabilities of a given plant, and effects on
the nearby population can vary greatly given the particulars of each plant,
the NEPA process is the ideal place to undertake a detailed analysis of these
possibilities. Since the NEPA process mandates a "detailed statement" with
an analysis of alternatives at the "heart" of the decision-making process, 30 7
it is a potentially fruitful forum to discuss, for each particular plant,
potential modes of attack, alternative security measures to guard against the
risk of an attack, and, most importantly, the range of environmental
consequences that could result from an attack, including the effect on the
nearby population.
However, critics will note that national security concerns should preclude
significant discussion of the relative likelihood of success of different
modes of attack, as well as the particular vulnerabilities of each plant.308
302. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 249.
306. See, e.g., supra notes 7, 12 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 41, 51 and accompanying text.
308. See, e.g., supra notes 114-19, 294-99 and accompanying text.
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This is a valid concern, and it is supported by NEPA's language that its
requirements should be consistent with other essential considerations of
national policy. 309 Preventing terrorists from accessing information about
the vulnerabilities of a nuclear plant is a top consideration of national
policy. However, Weinberger has made clear that sensitive national
security matters can be separated into nonpublic portions of an EIS.310
Moreover, NEPA itself allows the addition of "classified annexes" for
sensitive national security information. 311  FOIA exemptions provide
another mechanism by which portions of an EIS can be withheld from
public view.312
Importantly, though, there is no general national security exemption
within NEPA that allows an agency to forego the NEPA process entirely.313
In the context of terrorism, while certain portions of an EIS might be
withheld from public view, the issue of terrorism cannot be completely
excluded from a public EIS. An analysis of the specific vulnerabilities of a
given plant may arguably be too sensitive to release to the public, but the
range of consequences and effects arising from terrorist attacks should not
be excluded.314 The NRC's internal process is the best place to analyze
vulnerabilities and implement security measures, but the NEPA process is
the best place to detail the environmental effects of a variety of terrorist
scenarios. Moreover, while the public may be shielded from certain
portions of an EIS, the public nonetheless still has the opportunity to
contribute to the EIS during a public comment period, which is a vital part
of the NEPA process. 315
A qualitative analysis of the potential modes and consequences of an
attack on a specific nuclear plant is thus desirable when quantification is
highly uncertain or impossible. In addition, the NRC should not just be
able to claim as a blanket matter that quantification is impossible without
any proof that it has attempted to quantify the risk.316 The agency should
also detail the data, methodologies, and models it has used to come to this
conclusion. Taking these measures will ensure that the NRC complies with
NEPA's mandates to consider significant environmental effects and inform
the public that it has done So. 3 17  As Professor Daniel Farber notes,
"decision-makers, legislators, and members of the public are entitled to a
309. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 66, 254 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. Although the issue is outside the scope
of this inquiry, it is the view of the author that Congress should take action to establish a
procedure whereby an independent governmental body reviews the classified portions of a
NEPA document to ensure compliance with the statute.
316. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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candid discussion of the limits of the agency's ability to predict the
future." 318
Of course, none of these arguments are significant unless NEPA requires
an analysis of the environmental effects of a terrorist attack in the first
place. This Note argues that it does. The NRC's difficulty in quantifying
the probability of a terrorist attack is irrelevant for NEPA purposes, for
NEPA does not require quantification, 319 nor does it require a particular
model, methodology, or mode of decision making. 320 NEPA is mostly
concerned with qualitatively assessing environmental impacts, and while
there should of course be a limit to the impacts an agency is required to
consider under NEPA, the statute and regulations draw this boundary
liberally. 321 For instance, NEPA requires discussion of indirect effects,
defined as those effects "caused by the action and ... later in time or farther
removed in distance, but ... still reasonably foreseeable. 322
In addition, the presence of uncertainty does not absolve the agency of its
responsibility to discuss indirect impacts. Agencies should instead note the
presence of uncertain information and state its relevance to reasonably
foreseeable significant adverse impacts. 323 Significantly, under NEPA the
term "reasonably foreseeable" includes low-probability impacts that have
catastrophic consequences, as long as the analysis of the impacts is "not
based on pure conjecture, and ... within the rule of reason. ' 324 This Note
concludes that an analysis of the risk of a terrorist attack falls within this
statutory and regulatory language. After the terrorist attacks of September
11 and given our knowledge that terrorist groups consider nuclear power
plants possible targets, 325 the threat of a terrorist attack, and the potential
for devastating environmental consequences, can no longer be considered
beyond NEPA's scope. While it may be impossible to quantify the risk, the
fact that the government and general public know that terrorist
organizations-such as al-Qaeda, which has already successfully initiated a
major attack on the United States-target nuclear plants is sufficient to
place the risk within the rule of reason and outside the realm of "pure
conjecture." 326  Thus, because building or relicensing a nuclear facility
contributes to the possibility of a terrorist attack with catastrophic
consequences through the facility's mere existence, and since the possibility
of an attack is outside the realm of "pure conjecture," an analysis of the risk
of a terrorist attack should be included in an EIS.
Although this conclusion seems to be at odds with the logic of
Metropolitan Edison, the facts of Metropolitan Edison do not apply to the
318. Farber, supra note 54, at 32.
319. See supra note 248.
320. See supra notes 146, 170 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
322. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2009); see supra note 53.
323. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(2); see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
324. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4); see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
326. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4).
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risk of terrorism, and its attendant environmental effects, in the twenty-first
century. The Metropolitan Edison Court specifically addressed the
nonenvironmental (psychological) impacts caused by the mere perception
within the community of the risk of an accident. 327 This Note, however,
addresses the possibility of a terrorist attack itself and its attendant
environmental impacts. NEPA requires analysis of nonenvironmental
impacts only insofar as they are related to environmental impacts. 328 In
Metropolitan Edison, the nonenvironmental effects at issue were not related
to any environmental changes; rather, they were related to the perception of
the risk of an accident itself.329 This Note only analyzes environmental
impacts. A quote from Metropolitan Edison itself further clears up this
distinction: "[W]e are considering effects caused by the risk of an accident.
The situation where an agency is asked to consider effects that will occur if
a risk is realized, for example, if an accident occurs ... is an entirely
different case." 330
Finally, the Third Circuit's discussion in New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection of control and proximate cause 331 misses the
point. The doctrine of proximate cause addresses ex post liability; NEPA
addresses ex ante consideration of environmental effects.332 NEPA does
not contain any ex post provisions penalizing an agency if its predictions
turn out to be incorrect. 333 Thus, this is an inapplicable analogy; the real
question is whether the environmental effects of a terrorist attack are
sufficiently foreseeable to warrant consideration under NEPA.334
Moreover, the court's discussion of the NRC's limited control over terrorist
attacks may be correct, but it lies outside the scope of NEPA. NEPA
requires a discussion of the foreseeable environmental effects of an agency
action for use in the agency's decision-making process; 335 whether the
agency has control over those environmental effects is irrelevant. If an
effect is foreseeable and within the rule of reason, the agency must assess
and evaluate it under NEPA.
327. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
330. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 775 n.9 (1983);
see also supra note 245.
331. See supra notes 281-87 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 287.
333. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 287.
335. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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B. The Methodological Context. How Risk Assessment Scholarship Can
Inform NEPA Review of the Risk of a Terrorist Attack
1. Analysis of the Methodologies Underlying the Circuit Split
Both circuit courts, while they cloak their opinions in jurisprudential
terms of art such as "'reasonably close causal relationship"' 336 and "'remote
and speculative' 337 are really performing different types of risk assessment
and risk management. The concept of agency deference might lead one to
believe that courts are merely reviewing the risk analyses performed by the
agencies. In reality, however, the courts are also both assessing and
managing risk themselves by deciding whether the risk of a terrorist attack
is sufficiently probable or consequential to warrant regulatory action (in this
case, discussion and disclosure in an EIS). While the NAS insists that
objective risk assessment and value-laden risk management ought to be
separate processes, 338 this Note argues that the choice of a particular risk
assessment methodology is itself inherently value laden, since the choice of
one analytical framework (such as one that is primarily designed to assess
historical risks with a large sample size) necessarily precludes the choice of
others. 339 This Note also argues that each risk assessment methodology has
built-in assumptions concerning what risks should be studied or taken more
seriously. 340 Thus, while the litigating parties and agencies provide many
of the factual and scientific findings, courts both assess this data by
favoring a particular methodology to understand the data and manage risk
by ultimately deciding whether additional regulatory action is required or
not.
3 4 1
The Third Circuit's approach to risk assessment/management under
NEPA can be characterized in the following ways: (1) a preference for
quantitative cost-benefit analysis and probabilistic risk assessment over
qualitative discussion, (2) a belief in the primacy of probability over
336. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 561 F.3d 132, 140
(3d Cir. 2009); see supra note 283 and accompanying text.
337. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 449 F.3d 1016,
1030 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017,
1026 (9th Cir. 1980)); see supra note 245 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
340. For instance, the NAS framework and other types of probabilistic risk assessment
were specifically formulated to analyze historical risks, such as carcinogens already present
in the environment, rather than new risks such as terrorist attacks. See supra notes 131-35,
156-58 and accompanying text.
341. It is important to emphasize here that this Note does not mean to argue that the
courts consciously perform a formalized risk assessment, nor does it argue that the courts'
understanding of risk necessarily falls neatly into one of the mainstream methodologies or
frameworks for assessing and managing risk, such as the NAS Report's four-step
methodology. Rather, it advocates that many of the general ideas in the risk assessment
literature, such as the assessment of probabilities, the possibility of a wholly objective
assessment, the importance of consequences, and the significance of uncertainty, can inform
the ways these courts think about the risk of a terrorist attack.
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consequences, (3) an aversion to uncertainty, and (4) a belief in the
agency's ability to perform scientifically objective analyses. First, in its
emphasis on maintaining a reasonably close causal relationship between the
agency action and the environmental effects at issue, and its corresponding
discussion of the intervening events that would need to occur before a
successful terrorist attack on a plant,342 the court is foregrounding the issue
of probability. The more steps in between the relicensing and an attack, the
less probable an attack seems. Indeed, the logic of proximate cause is to
absolve an original actor of responsibility when intervening conduct is
sufficiently improbable. 343
Moreover, in its emphasis on the extraordinary nature of terrorist
attacks,344 the court seems to infer that the lack of historical data on terrorist
attacks at nuclear power plants in effect proves the low probability of the
risk. This approach illustrates an aversion to uncertainty. However, simply
because the probability of a risk cannot be estimated using historical data
does not mean that the probability of the risk is low. Rather, the risk of a
terrorist attack is a new risk, whereby the level of uncertainty is high and
the ability to show the low probability or insignificance of the risk is
limited.345
The court also shows an aversion to discussing the potentially
catastrophic consequences of a terrorist attack. As noted above, the
discussion focuses mostly on probability, but risk is not just a matter of
probability; it is a matter of the severity of the consequences of an event
discounted by the probability. 346 The court's focus on the NRC's level of
control somewhat obscures the fact that it had just blindly accepted the
agency's conclusion that the risk of an attack is (1) low probability rather
than uncertain and (2) sufficiently low probability that a discussion of the
potentially catastrophic consequences is irrelevant. This is problematic for
several reasons.
First, the public is extremely averse to risks with potentially catastrophic
consequences. 347 Catastrophic risks also tend to have huge ex ante and ex
post secondary ripple effects.348  Moreover, terrorism is inherently
uncertain, unexpected, dramatic, and clustered, which causes a great deal of
342. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 561 F.3d 132, 139-
140 (3d Cir. 2009); see supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
343. See, e.g., supra note 285 and accompanying text.
344. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 140-41; see supra notes 285-87 and
accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 133-37, 176-82 and accompanying text. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit's approach also does not take into account the fact that the notion of
what constitutes a plausible terrorist attack has changed drastically since the terrorist attacks
of September 11. While this does not allow one to conclude definitively that the probability
of a major terrorist attack is now higher than it once was (due to a sample size problem), it
does foreground the notion that terrorist attacks can be unexpected, unforeseen, and severe,
despite the prognostications of those whoclaim they are low-probability events.
346. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 152, 182, 207 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 152, 180-81 and accompanying text.
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public fear.349 Thus, the costs associated with catastrophic terrorist attacks
are potentially enormous, and they should not be ignored simply because a
definite probability cannot be assigned.
In addition, the NEPA regulations themselves require a discussion of
reasonably foreseeable, low-probability impacts with catastrophic
consequences, provided that analysis is not based on pure conjecture and is
within the rule of reason.350  Events such as the terrorist attacks of
September 11 and the knowledge that terrorists select nuclear plants as
potential targets should not automatically lead one to believe that a terrorist
attack on a nuclear plant is probable, but they do demonstrate the possibility
of an attack and that it is at least outside the realm of pure conjecture.
The court's deference to the NRC, as well as its discussion of the
agency's limited resources, 351 shows a great deal of confidence in the
agency's internal risk assessment procedures and its conclusion that the risk
of terrorism is too improbable to be included in a site-specific EIS. 352 By
simply accepting the agency's conclusion that the hard-to-quantify nature of
the risk forecloses a site-specific NEPA review, the court assumes that the
agency experts have used objective and value-free data to come to its
conclusion, despite the fact that the public is not privy to the agency's
reasoning. Instead, the public only gets the conclusion itself. Without the
ability to analyze the reasoning behind this conclusion, it is especially hard
to see why the NRC decided that its decision is "politically, economically,
and ethically acceptable." 353 Moreover, the NRC is not the sole agency
entrusted to implement NEPA; thus, courts should be more wary about
deferring to the NRC's interpretation of the statute. 354 In addition, the
court's emphasis on the limited resources of the agency echoes some of the
Precautionary Principle criticism, which holds that an emphasis on worst-
case presumptions for uncertain harms can have the effect of reallocating
agency resources from more obvious, known environmental risks to highly
uncertain risks.355
The Ninth Circuit takes a wholly different methodological approach to
assessing the risk of terrorism. First, it distinguished Metropolitan Edison
as a case dealing primarily with the connection between direct,
nonenvironmental effects of a federal action (in that case the perception of a
risk of an accident) and secondary, indirect effects (psychological health of
the community).35 6  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit was assessing the
349. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
351. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 561 F.3d 132, 141-
42 (3d Cir. 2009); see supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
353. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 130, at 7; see also supra note 160 and
accompanying text.
354. See supra note 61 (explaining that Chevron deference does not apply to NEPA).
355. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
356. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 449 F.3d 1016,
1029 (9th Cir. 2006); see supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
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connection between the federal action itself (the addition of spent fuel
storage space) and a direct effect (the environmental effects of the terrorist
attack itself, discounted by the probability). 357 In doing this, the court
essentially tightened the "causal chain" between the federal action and the
effect to be discussed. While the Third Circuit emphasized the intervening
steps between the action and the consequences, the Ninth Circuit
disregarded some of these same steps. One can argue whether and to what
extent the risk of a terrorist attack is a "direct" consequence of a major
federal action, but the important point is that the Ninth Circuit questioned
the NRC's conclusion that a terrorist attack is an attenuated, low-probability
event.
By placing the burden on the NRC to show that the risk of an attack is
remote and speculative as a matter of law,358 the court showed a healthy
skepticism of the reasoning and value judgments behind the agency's risk
assessment and management. Specifically, the terrorist attacks of
September 11-and the fact that the NRC claims to have significantly
increased its security since then-led the court to question whether an
attack, with all its inherent uncertainties, can simply be categorized as low-
probability as a matter of law. 359
The court also accepted the idea that uncertainty in quantification does
not foreclose discussion under NEPA, especially when the potential
consequences are catastrophic. 360  A quantitative discussion, while
potentially helpful if possible, is not necessary. 361  The court thus
understood, perhaps subconsciously, the distinction between the NAS form
of risk assessment, which emphasizes testing of easier-to-measure historical
risks, such as the level of carcinogens in the atmosphere, and the more
qualitative discussion of new risks. New risks are particularly amenable to
qualitative discussion because while the range of consequences, including a
worst-case scenario, is often known, a probability distribution is inherently
difficult, if not impossible, to formulate. 362 Thus, under NEPA, where
quantification is not required, a qualitative discussion of likely modes of
attack and potential environmental consequences of an attack is warranted
for new risks such as terrorism.
Both circuit courts to some degree accept the problem of quantifying the
risk of terrorism. While the Third Circuit defers to the NRC's conclusion
that the risk is low probability, 363 the Ninth Circuit, understanding the
problem of quantifying probabilities, shifts its focus to the consequences of
357. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1030; see supra notes 244-45 and accompanying
text.
358. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 248-49, 252 and accompanying text.
361. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1031; see supra notes 248-49 and accompanying
text.
362. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
363. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 561 F.3d 132, 143
(3d Cir. 2009); see supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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terrorism. 364 In its emphasis on the events of September 11, the NRC's
claim that it has greatly improved its security against terrorist threats, and
the variety of methods by which terrorists could target a nuclear power
plant, the Ninth Circuit in effect takes a precautionary approach to this
particular risk. Consistent with NEPA, of course, the court does not use
one of the stronger versions of the Precautionary Principle, 365 for NEPA
does not mandate certain results. It merely mandates that certain effects be
considered in the decision-making process. Thus, the court clearly could
not tell the agency not to build the power plant at all, nor could it mandate
the use of "Best Available Technology." 366 On the other hand, the court
does not merely use the "Non-Preclusion" version of the Principle, 367 for
this would just amount to the court permitting the NRC to take the risk of a
terrorist attack into account, but not requiring it to do so.
The closest the court comes to a version of the Principle is the "Margin
of Safety" version. 368 In effect, the court, by ruling that the risk of a
terrorist attack cannot be withheld from NEPA review as a matter of law,
agrees with the NEPA framers that requiring a detailed statement that takes
into account a range of environmental effects of a proposed action will
encourage better decision making.369  Mandatory consideration of
environmental impacts in an EIS could thus act as a margin of safety that
ensures that agencies do not plan actions without an eye toward the
environmental consequences of these actions.
In putting the burden of proof on the NRC to show that the risk of a
terrorist attack is not remote and speculative, the court also agrees with
critics of risk assessment that in areas of uncertainty, regulators should not
just be able to disregard a risk. 370  Rather, they should disclose their
methodologies, models, and reasoning to the public, accounting for
attendant uncertainty. 371 This will at least reassure the public that the issue
has been analyzed honestly and thoroughly, and if it has not, it can
theoretically lead to democratic opposition to the agency's treatment of the
risk.
2. The Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle: A Call to Action
Addressing the risk of a terrorist attack in the NEPA context is an ideal
place to implement the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle. There
are obvious problems in analyzing this type of risk under traditional
methodologies. For example, the NAS methodology tends to favor
364. Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1030-31; see supra notes 246-49 and accompanying
text.
365. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 150, 173-74 and accompanying text.
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historical risks that can be tested and measured, whereas the risk of a
terrorist attack on a nuclear plant is a new risk that is not easily amenable to
quantification. 372  Moreover, if we conceive of risk as probability
multiplied by consequences, risk assessors who favor a finding of a
significant probability of harm before acting on the risk will tend to devalue
the risk of terrorism. Despite the severity of its consequences, the
uncertainty of terrorism may lead regulators to disregard the risk as one of
low probability. 373 Risk assessment in the federal government also often
does not account for the public's risk aversion to catastrophic harm,
especially terrorism, due to its secondary costs. 374
There are also problems with applying traditional conceptions of the
Precautionary Principle in the NEPA context. First, NEPA does not require
particular substantive action.375  So, stronger versions of the Principle,
which call for prohibition or "Best Available Technology" for activities
posing an uncertain potential for great harm, 376 will fall outside NEPA's
scope: a federal judge cannot require an agency to shut down a nuclear
power plant or implement specific security measures just because there is
the possibility of catastrophic harm. In addition, weaker versions of the
Principle 377 probably will not add anything to the NEPA process. If
discussing particular environmental effects is optional rather than
mandatory, as the weak version holds, nothing will have changed-the
agency, in its discretion, can decide that the risk of terrorism is not
significant enough to warrant NEPA review.
The Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle provides the most
appealing methodological basis to support NEPA analysis of the risk of
terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities. 378  It is inappropriate to wait to
regulate "new" catastrophic risks, such as the risk of terrorism, until we
learn more about them or can quantify their probabilities, assuming there
comes a time when they are quantifiable. The problem with catastrophic
risks is that it is not desirable for society to reach a point where it could
confidently assess the probabilities associated with catastrophic risk-for
this would mean that a sufficiently large sample of catastrophes existed.
The almost unthinkable societal costs of a successful terrorist attack on a
nuclear facility, both direct and secondary, should be something to avoid at
all costs. Thus, in the context of catastrophic harm, there should be a
general preference for overregulating to ensure that the risks, with their
enormous potential for societal damage, remain hypothetical.
This is where the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle steps in.
The risk of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility is inherently uncertain.
372. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 152-55, 179-84 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 62, 67 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
378. See supra Part I.C.3.
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The outcome of a successful attack has the potential to be catastrophic. The
events of September 11 and the knowledge that terrorists consider nuclear
plants desirable targets make the possibility of such an attack foreseeable or
plausible, not mere conjecture. Thus, according to the Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary Principle, under these circumstances, if the costs of
regulating this catastrophic possibility are not prohibitive and do not
substantially divert resources from extremely pressing problems, there
should be a presumption in favor of regulation. 379
This Note argues that costs of considering the risks of terrorism in detail
in an EIS are not prohibitive and do not substantially divert resources from
extremely pressing problems. The NRC is accustomed to a lengthy,
detailed NEPA process. It already discusses numerous risks, including
extremely dangerous risks. Asking the agency to consider another type of
risk-one that is foreseeable and could potentially cause catastrophic
harm-in this same process is appropriate. In addition, the costs of
requiring the agency to detail and consider various terrorism scenarios in an
EIS do not approach the costs of substantively mandating certain security
measures or ordering that a plant be shut down.
Incurring the costs of requiring the NRC to consider terrorism under
NEPA is a more sensible, prudent approach than ignoring the potentially
devastating environmental and societal costs of a terrorist attack. The
NRC's position that it has considered the costs of a terrorist attack outside
of the NEPA context is insufficient, for the framers of NEPA intended the
statute to be a method by which the public is assured that the agency has
substantively considered these costs in detail.380
In addition, judicial use of the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle
would be consistent with prevailing judicial interpretations of NEPA.
Applying this Principle to NEPA would only mandate that an agency
consider the environmental impacts related to terrorism in its decision-
making process. 381 If it turned out that a particular alternative to preventing
terrorism at a nuclear plant was prohibitively expensive, such as the
extreme example of shutting down a plant altogether, the NRC would not
need to actually implement it, at least under NEPA. Thus, NEPA's
requirements would remain procedural.
In addition, applying the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle
under NEPA would assuage the fears of those who believe that this
Principle would encourage overly costly regulatory measures. The only
mandatory costs would be the costs of compiling various alternatives that
could be used to address the risk and researching potential methods of
379. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the NEPA
regulations themselves contain language that mandates a similar approach. If "incomplete
information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts is essential to a
reasoned choice among alternatives and the overall costs of obtaining it are not exorbitant,"
then the agency should discuss the information in an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(a) (2009).
380. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 59-62, 67 and accompanying text.
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attack and a range of environmental impacts for the specific plant.
Incurring these costs would be consistent with NEPA's requirement that
agencies take a "hard look" at environmental impacts, as well as its
mandate to consider reasonably foreseeable impacts with the potential for
catastrophic harm. 382
Some might argue that merely detailing the risks of terrorism in an EIS
will not truly reduce the risk of an attack, and thus the Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary Principle, which advocates regulating a catastrophic risk only
when the regulation will actually reduce the risk of the worst-case
scenario,383 is inapplicable. Proponents of this view might contend that the
NRC's internal security measures are the proper place to reduce the risk of
terrorism. They might also contend that detailing the risk of terrorism in an
EIS could potentially help terrorists by giving them access to the
vulnerabilities of a specific plant.
The NRC's internal security measures are of course invaluable in
combating the risk of terrorism.384  However, the NEPA process is
invaluable as well. The framers of the statute, as well as the courts
interpreting it, considered the NEPA process inherently beneficial in and of
itself in reducing harmful environmental impacts. 38 5  An agency that
complies with the letter of NEPA should be taking important environmental
considerations into account during its decision-making process. 386 Thus,
the idea is that an agency that is forced to publicly consider environmental
risks will be forced to make better decisions regarding the environmental
consequences of its actions. This is the thrust of NEPA.
If one considers the ideas behind the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle in conjunction with the polices behind NEPA, completion of an
EIS will lead to better, more transparent agency decision making and is thus
a regulatory measure that could reduce the worst consequences of a
successful terrorist attack. The NRC should thus consider the realistic
possibility of catastrophic harm that could result from a terrorist attack on a
nuclear plant.
CONCLUSION
The concern over global climate change, with its potential for extremely
wide reaching catastrophic harm, is contributing to a level of support for
nuclear power not seen in its history.387 Undoubtedly, nuclear power can
be an extremely important means of reducing our country's dependence on
382. See supra notes 55-56, 59 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
384. In fact, an argument can be made that there should be a presumption toward
overregulating the catastrophic risks of a terrorist attack outside the NEPA process as well,
for instance by mandating "Best Available Technology" for a nuclear plant's security
apparatuses and mitigation plans. However, this argument is outside the scope of this Note.
385. See supra notes 36-38, 62-65 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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greenhouse gases, while still meeting our energy needs, especially as the
technology for reliable renewable sources of energy is still highly uncertain.
However, the optimism about the role of nuclear power in the climate
change context should not blind us to the potential problems of nuclear
power, especially in the age of terrorism. After the terrorist attacks of
September 11, agencies and courts should no longer consider major terrorist
acts causing large numbers of fatalities and massive societal disruption
beyond the realm of possibility. In addition, the fact that extremely
dangerous terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda considered attacking a nuclear
plant should lead us to perform significant due diligence in considering
terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities.
While this Note certainly acknowledges the NRC's assertion that it has
made numerous security improvements after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, it argues that this assertion is not sufficient to comply with
the letter of the law. NEPA was enacted to ensure the public that agencies
take environmental impacts and general human welfare into account when
making major decisions. 388 Before NEPA, agencies could simply assert
that thcy have considered environmental impacts, but there was no way for
the public to confirm this. NEPA has provided this check. The catastrophic
possibilities associated with a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility should
not be taken lightly. It is not sufficient to simply disregard them as low
probability. It only takes one successful attack on a nuclear facility to cause
massive societal harm, and agencies should take every reasonable measure
to ensure the public that they are substantively taking the risk of such an
attack into account.
388. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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